GrassrootWiki - User contributions [en]

Template:Nhsc-v1-12

2006-07-22T12:22:50Z

Jennifer Wada:

children was a top priority for
native Hawaiian parents.

=====Employment=====
In 1970, 4.3 percent of native
Hawaiian men and 5.2 percent of native
Hawaiian women were unemployed,
compared to State figures of 2.6 percent
and 3.7 percent, respectively.
Of all native Hawaiian males over the
age of 16, 76.4 percent were in the
labor force in 1970, compared with the
total State figure of 81.5 percent.
Also in 1970, 47.9 percent of native
Hawaiian women over the age of 16 were
in the labor force, compared with 49
percent for the State as a whole.

A 1975 Census Update Survey
estimated that the unemployment rate
for native Hawaiians was 11.6 percent,
compared to 6.5 percent for the State
of Hawaii as a whole. The present
rate is probably even higher. Other
data for 1975 show that only 17.8 percent
of native Hawaiian men have
professional/managerial positions,
while 53.6 percent are classified as
blue collar workers.

=====Income=====
In 1949, the proportion of native
Hawaiian males in the lowest income
brackets was above that for all other
groups. Their median income for the
same year was higher than the "all
races" and Filipino groups but below
that of the Chinese, Caucasian, and
Japanese groups. By 1969, the situation
of the native Hawaiians had
improved somewhat. According to
the U.S. Census, they were no longer
over-represented in the lowest income
categories.

According to the 1975 Census Update
Survey, however, native Hawaiian
personal income was still below the
Caucasian and State-wide figures.
Other data for 1977 show that the
(civilian) median family income of
pure Hawaiians was lower than the
part-Hawaiian, Filipino, Caucasian,
Japanese, and Chinese groups. The
part-Hawaiian group was third lowest
(Filipinos were second).

In 1975, over one-fourth (27 percent)
of native Hawaiians were
classified as below the poverty
level. In 1982, the number of
native Hawaiians on welfare (Aid to
Families with Dependent Children)
and general assistance) was
significantly higher than their
relative share of the population.

=====Criminal Justice=====
The percent of native Hawaiian
adults arrested in Hawaii in 1981
was higher than the native Hawaiian
percentage share of the
population. The percentage of
native Hawaiians arrested for
specific crimes was also larger for
many types of crime than their share
of the population.

The picture for native Hawaiian
juveniles arrested is even more
striking. Native Hawaiian juveniles
comprised the largest percent of
those arrested for each crime
examined.

=====Health=====
Infant mortality remains significantly higher for native Hawaiians
compared to the other groups in
Hawaii. Part-Hawaiians have a birth
rate of 23.1, compared to 17.5 for
full-Hawaiians and 19.5 for the
State. Part-Hawaiians and full-
Hawaiians also have a significantly
higher rate of illegitimate births
than the other ethnic groups.

Native Hawaiians have historically
had a lower life expectancy than
other groups in Hawaii. This trend
continues—in 1970, the native
Hawaiian life expectancy was 67.62
years, compared with an average for
the State of 74.20 years.
{{p|12}}

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2006-07-17T11:17:42Z

Jennifer Wada:

children was a top priority for
native Hawaiian parents.

=====Employment=====
In 1970, 4.3 percent of native
Hawaiian men and 5.2 percent of native
Hawaiian women were unemployed,
compared to State figures of 2.6 percent
and 3.7 percent, respectively.
Of all native Hawaiian males over the
age of 16, 76.4 percent were in the
labor force in 1970, compared with the
total State figure of 81.5 percent.
Also in 1970, 47.9 percent of native
Hawaiian women over the age of 16 were
in the labor force, compared with 49
percent for the State as a whole.

A 1975 Census Update Survey
estimated that the unemployment rate
for native Hawaiians was 11.6 percent,
compared to 6.5 percent for the State
of Hawaii as a whole. The present
rate is probably even higher. Other
data for 1975 show that only 17.8 percent
of native Hawaiian men have
professional/managerial positions,
while 53.6 percent are classified as
blue collar workers.

=====Income=====
In 1949, the proportion of native
Hawaiian males in the lowest income
brackets was above that for all other
groups. Their median income for the
same year was higher than the "all
races" and Filipino groups but below
that of the Chinese, Caucasian, and
Japanese groups. By 1969, the situation
of the native Hawaiians had
improved somewhat. According to
the U.S. Census, they were no longer
over-represented in the lowest income
categories.

According to the 1975 Census Update
Survey, however, native Hawaiian
personal income was still below the
Caucasian and State-wide figures.
Other data for 1977 show that the
(civilian) median family income of
pure Hawaiians was lower than the
part-Hawaiian, Filipino, Caucasian,
Japanese, and Chinese groups. The
part-Hawaiian group was third lowest
(Filipinos were second).

In 1975, over one-fourth (27 percent)
of native Hawaiians were
classified as below the poverty
level . In 1982, the number of
native Hawaiians on welfare (Aid to
Families with Dependent Children)
and general assistance) was
significantly higher than their
relative share of the population.

=====Criminal Justice=====
The percent of native Hawaiian
adults arrested in Hawaii in 1981
was higher than the native Hawaiian
percentage share of the
population. The percentage of
native Hawaiians arrested for
specific crimes was also larger for
many types of crime than their share
of the population.

The picture for native Hawaiian
juveniles arrested is even more
striking. Native Hawaiian juveniles
comprised the largest percent of
those arrested for each crime
examined.

=====Health=====
Infant mortality remains significantly higher for native Hawaiians
compared to the other groups in
Hawaii. Part-Hawaiians have a birth
rate of 23.1, compared to 17.5 for
full-Hawaiians and 19.5 for the
State. Part-Hawaiians and full-
Hawaiians also have a significantly
higher rate of illegitimate births
than the other ethnic groups.

Native Hawaiians have historically
had a lower life expectancy than
other groups in Hawaii. This trend
continues—in 1970, the native
Hawaiian life expectancy was 67.62
years, compared with an average for
the State of 74.20 years.
{{p|12}}

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2006-07-17T08:59:22Z

Jennifer Wada:

=Executive Summary=

==VOLUME I==

===CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS===
The conclusions and recommendations
of the Native Hawaiians Study
Commission immediately follow t h is
Executive Summary. They are not
summarized here.

===PART I, SOCIOECONOMIC AND CULTURAL SECTION===
Part I of the Final Report of the
Native Hawaiians Study Commission
presents information and statistics on
various socioeconomic and cultural
factors affecting the lives of native
Hawaiians. The contents of each
chapter are summarized below.

===="Demographics"====
This chapter presents a demographic
profile of native Hawaiians in the
following areas.

=====Characteristics of the Population=====
After the the arrival of foreigners
in Hawaii in 1778, the native
population drastically declined. This
trend was reversed in the beginning of
this century when the part-Hawaiian
population began a rapid increase , a
trend that continues today.

This section also summarizes the
present characteristics of the native
Hawaiian population. According to the
State of Hawaii, in 1980 there were
9,366 full-Hawaiians and 166,087 part-
Hawaiians, comprising about 19 percent
of the State's population. Native
Hawaiians are a young population — in
1980, the median age for males was
22.0, and the median age for females
was 23.2. The male/female ratio for
native Hawaiians is fairly equal -- in
1980 males accounted for 49.5 percent
of the native Hawaiian population , and
females accounted for 50.5 percent.

=====Geographic Distribution=====
The majority of the native Hawaiian
population (as well as the majority of
the State's population) lives on Oahu.
There still exist pockets of native
Hawaiians located in economically
deprived, rural areas on many islands.

=====Education=====
The percentage of native Hawaiian
children between the ages of 14 and 17
who were enrolled in school in 1970
was lower than that for any other
group in Hawaii (91.6 percent for
females and 90.7 percent for males,
compared to an overall State figure of
94.8 percent). The median number of
years of school completed by native
Hawaiians over 25 years of age in 1970
was 12.0, compared to a State median
of 12.3. Only 49.7 percent of native
Hawaiians over 25 had graduated from
high school in 1970. In 1970, only
4.2 percent of native Hawaiians over
25 had completed four or more years of
college, a figure lower than that for
any of the other ethnic groups in
Hawaii.

State of Hawaii data for 1977 show
little improvement: only 46.9
percent of native Hawaiians over 25
had graduated from high school.
Figures for that same year also showed
that only 4.6 percent of native Hawaiians
over 25 had completed four or
more years of college, a percentage
still lower than that for any other
ethnic group. A 1976 Alu Like, Inc.,
Needs Assessment Survey indicated,
however, that education for their
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2006-07-17T06:51:47Z

Jennifer Wada:

* Part II
**"Land Laws and Land Relationships":
***approve (Shipley, Anderson, Dinkins, Handley, Morales, Schleede);
***disapprove (Kamali'i, Beamer,Betts)
**"Diplomatic and Congressional History: From Monarchy to Statehood":
***approve (Shipley, Anderson, Dinkins, Handley, Morales, Schleede);
***disapprove (Kamali'i, Beamer, Betts)
**"Existing Law, Native Hawaiians, and Compensation":
***approve (Shipley, Anderson, Dinkins, Handley, Morales, Schleede);
***disapprove (Kamali'i, Beamer, Betts)
**"Review of Hawaiian Homes Commission Programs":
***approve (Shipley, Anderson, Dinkins, Handley, Morales, Schleede);
***disapprove (Kamali'i, Beamer, Betts)
**"Federal Responses to the Unique Needs of Native Hawaiians": unanimously approved
**"State of Hawaii's Responses to Native Hawaiians' Unique Needs": unanimously approved
**"Private and Local Responses to Special Needs of Native Hawaiians": unanimously approved
* List of References: unanimously approved
* Appendix: unanimously approved

Three of the Commissioners also
presented a substitute {{*}}/ for the
"Conclusions and Recommendations"
section. The latter had been
previously circulated by the committee
chairmen. During the second day of
the Commission's March meeting, the
three Hawaiian members announced that
they would be developing and
submitting a minority report.

{{break}}
{{*}}/ This substitute was reviewed by
the Commissioners during their March
meeting, but had not been circulated
previously. The substitute section is
reproduced in this Report in the
Appendix.
{{p|7}}

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2006-07-16T12:30:24Z

Jennifer Wada:

Interest in the Draft Report was
great, and the Commission received
numerous requests for an extension of
the deadline for public comments. To
accommodate all of those who wished to
comment, the Commission announced in
the Federal Register and through its
office in Hawaii that it would extend
the comment period for an additional
sixty days—to January 23, 1983.

By the end of January, the
Commission had received almost one
hundred written comments on the Draft
Report from individuals, native
Hawaiian organizations, State
government agencies, Congressmen, and
Federal agencies. The Commission's
Draft Report was revised based on all
these comments, as well as on the new
information that had been collected by
the Commission since the publication
of the Draft Report. Because of their
importance, the written comments
received considerable attention as the
Final Report was drafted. As a
result, the written comments received
by the Commission on its Draft Report
appear in the Final Report in three
different ways. First, as required by
statute, all written comments received
by the Commission are reproduced in
full in the Appendix of the Final
Report. Second, some of the comments
were used to revise the text of the
main Report and these comments are
referenced in the text where they are
used. Finally, there is a summary in
the Appendix of all written comments
that are not specifically referenced
in the text of the Report.

The revised Draft Report, including
draft conclusions and recommendations
based on the Report and the information
gathered by the Commission, was
sent by the chairmen of the two committees
for review, prior to the
Commission's meeting in March 1983.
At this meeting, the Commission
reviewed each section of the Report
and voted on whether to approve and
accept each chapter. The results of
these votes are as follows:

* Preface: unanimously approved

* Approach and Methodology:
**approve (Shipley, Anderson, Dinkins, Handley, Morales, Schleede)
**disapprove (Kamali'i, Beamer, Betts)

* Executive Summary:
**approve (Shipley, Anderson, Dinkins, Handley, Morales, Schleede)
**disapprove (Kamali'i, Beamer, Betts)

* Conclusions and Recommendations:
**approve (Shipley, Anderson, Dinkins, Handley, Morales, Schleede)
**disapprove (Kamali'i, Beamer, Betts)

* Part I
**"Demographics": unanimously approved
**"Health and Social Services": unanimously approved
**"Education": unanimously approved
**"Housing": unanimously approved
**"Ancient History to the Reciprocity Treaty":
***approve (Shipley, Anderson, Dinkins, Handley, Morales, Schleede);
***disapprove (Kamali'i, Beamer, Betts)
**"Native Hawaiian Culture": unanimously approved
**"Native Hawaiian Religion": unanimously approved
{{p|6}}

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2006-07-15T12:36:56Z

Jennifer Wada:

secretary for the Washington office,
and a Hawaii Coordinator and a
secretary for the Hawaii office.

The Commission's series of public
hearings in Hawaii to begin the data
collection phase of the study plan was
held in January 1982. Eight public
hearings were held on the islands of
Oahu, Molokai, Maui, Hawaii, and
Kauai. The Commission heard testimony
and received written statements from
hundreds of individuals during the
dozens of hours of hearings. Everyone
who wanted to testify was given the
opportunity. Those testifying
included native and non-native
Hawaiians of all age levels and from
all walks of life. In addition, an
informational meeting was held to
acquaint Commissioners with the key
issues relating to native Hawaiians.
At this meeting, Commissioners heard
expert testimony from representatives
of several organizations that are
intimately involved in native Hawaiian
programs and problems, including: Alu
Like, Inc., the Hawaiian Homes Commission,
the Office of Hawaiian
Affairs, and the Bishop Estate.
Throughout its stay in Hawaii, the
Commission heard and experienced,
first-hand, numerous statements on
the entire spectrum of issues
regarding the culture, needs, and
concerns of native Hawaiians: the
homesteading program, preservation of
religious sites, educational problems,
health, land issues, legal rights,
preservation of the Hawaiian language
and culture, and many more.

The Commission then divided its
members into two committees to
organize, research, and draft the two
primary sections of its study plan.
As a result of the wealth of
information received at the hearings
in Hawaii, the two committees of the
Commission were able to refine and
elaborate on the Commission's original
study plan. As contemplated by the
Commission's approved study plan, data
collection and drafting of particular
sections of the study were assigned to
various Commissioners and to the
staff. As indicated earlier, the
Commission relied on the resources of
other agencies for assistance in
information-gathering activities,
including the U.S. Census Bureau, the
U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, the U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development, the
U.S. Department of Agriculture, the
U.S. Department of the Interior, the
U.S. Department of Justice, and the
Naval Historical Research Center.

As the data collection effort
continued, the third phase of the
study plan (assimilation and analysis
of facts and information) was begun by
the two committees and the staff,
based on the information already
collected from the public hearings,
from State and Federal agencies, and
from other organizations. Preliminary
drafts of the Draft Report of Findings
were reviewed by the Commission in
June and August. The culmination of
this process was the publication of
the Commission's Draft Report of
Findings on September 23, 1982, as
required by law.

After publication of the Draft
Report, the Commission announced in
the Federal Register, and through its
office in Hawaii, that there would be
a public comment period on the Draft
Report of sixty days—from September 23
to November 23, 1982 (as set forth in
the Commission's study plan). To
encourage the submission of written
comments, copies of the Report were
circulated in Hawaii to individuals,
native Hawaiian organizations, and
State government agencies. Copies of
the Draft Report were also placed in
public libraries throughout the State
to ensure increased access to the
Report by the public at large. On the
mainland, copies of the Report were
circulated to members of Congress, to
Federal Government agencies, and to
other interested organizations and
individuals.
{{p|5}}

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2006-07-15T12:32:34Z

Jennifer Wada:

developed materials and written its
Report with extensive public participation.
It conducted hearings
throughout Hawaii in January 1982. It
has held a number of meetings open to
the public. Its Draft Report has been
circulated for public comment, and the
comments received from a spectrum of
the public have been analyzed and
reflected in the Report. Thus, a
large number of people of diverse
background, experience, and race have
contributed to and commented on this
Report, as envisioned in the Act that
established the Commission.

The findings of the Draft Report
and a major part of the Final Report
have been reviewed and adopted by the
nine Commission members. The goal of
the Act, to assure a fair Report
through diverse representation and
contribution, has been realized.

===B. METHODOLOGY===
President Reagan appointed the nine
Native Hawaiians Study Commissioners
in September, 1981, and the Commission's
first meeting was held on
September 23, 1981. During the
remainder of 1981, the Commission
developed and adopted a study plan and
a budget. The Commission's study plan
outlined the substantive areas of
study as well as the timing of the
various phases of the study. Substantively,
the study plan proposed
the gathering of information in two
basic areas:

*Socioeconomic and cultural, including education, health, employment, housing, history, language, and religion; and

*Federal, State, and local relationships, including diplomatic history, history of land ownership, assessment of the State, private and local programs, review of the overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy and the subsequent annexation of Hawaii to the United States, and identification of Federal programs for which native Hawaiians might be eligible.

The study plan also defined the
schedule for the Commission's work:

I. Organize Commission and staff,
November-December, 1981;

II. Collect facts and information,
January-June, 1982;

III. Assimilate and analyze facts
and information, draft
findings, June-August, 1982;

IV. Commissioners review, discuss,
and revise first draft of
findings, August, 1982;

V. Publication of Draft Report of
Findings, circulated for 60
days for public comment,
September 23, 1982
(publication date required by
Sec. 303(c) of P.L. 96-565);

VI. Further study and development
of proposals for the Final
Report, November, 1982-June,
1983;

VII. Submission of Final Report to
Congress, June 23, 1983 (submission
date required by Sec.
303(d) of P.L. 96-565).

As indicated above, Commission
funding for fiscal year 1982 was
received from the President's
Unanticipated Needs Fund in December
1981. (In October 1982, the
Commission received an appropriation
for the fiscal year 1983 funding
necessary to complete its work.) In
January 1982, the Commission hired its
staff—an Executive Director and a
{{p|4}}

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2006-07-15T12:23:34Z

Jennifer Wada:

==Approach And Methodology==

===A. APPROACH===
The Native Hawaiians Study
Commission was established by an Act
signed into law on December 22, 1980
(Public Law 96-565, Title III). This
Act defined the duties of the Commission
as follows:

:Sec. 303(a) The Commission shall conduct a study of the culture, needs and concerns of the Native Hawaiians.

:(b) The Commission shall conduct such hearings as it considers appropriate and shall provide notice of such hearings to the public, including information concerning the date, location and topic of each hearing. The Commission shall take such other actions as it considers necessary to obtain full public participation in the study undertaken by the Commission.

The Congress provided in the Act
that a Commission of nine members be
appointed by the President. Further,
it provided that "not more than three
of such members shall be residents of
the State of Hawaii." President
Reagan appointed to the Commission
three persons from Hawaii and six
government officials. {{*}}/

Since the Congress had not
appropriated funds for the Commission,
it was immediately faced with a
decision as to whether to (1) delay
all work until a supplemental appropriation
could be obtained (possibly
not until late Spring of 1982), or (2)
seek funds from the President's unanticipated
needs appropriation. (Other
funding options were blocked by the
Anti-Deficiency Act.) To avoid delay,
the Commission chose to seek funds
from the unanticipated needs
appropriation. Since funds in that
account are limited, the Commission
developed a work plan that would
permit holding Commission funding to a
minimum and permit heavy reliance on
assistance from other agencies,
pursuant to the authority of Section
303(j) of P.L. 96-565.

Upon approval of funds by the
President, the Commission established
a staff, with two persons in
Washington and two in Honolulu. As
part of the Commission's budget submission
to Congress in March, 1982, it
stated that its resource requirements
had been reduced to a minimum and that
"to the greatest extent possible, the
Commission will rely on other agencies
for the support needed in its
information-gathering activities."
(Request for Supplemental Appropriation,
March, 1982.) Thus, the full
Commission had decided, and the
Congress was fully informed, that
material for the Report would be
developed, researched, and prepared by
government officials. In fact, the
Commission has relied extensively on
the substantial expertise of employees
of appropriate agencies. At every
stage the full Commission was aware of
the scope of the project and who would
develop information for and write
particular portions of the Report.

Also, as provided for in the Act
establishing it, the Commission has

{{break}}
{{*}}/ Appointment of government
officials to the Commission was
specifically contemplated by Congress,
since the enabling Act provided that
"members of the Commission who are
fulltime officers or employees of the
United States shall receive no
additional pay on account of their
services on the Commission" (Section
302(g)).

{{p|3}}

Template:Nhsc-v1-420

2006-06-12T02:49:02Z

Jennifer Wada:

using the definition of poverty used
in compiling the 1970 census); (2)
children in families receiving AFDC
payments in excess of the poverty
level for a non-farm family of four
(updated annually); (3) neglected or
delinquent children residing in
institutions which are not
State-operated; and (4) foster
children supported with public funds.
Authorizations are ratably reduced to
the appropriated amount. In addition
each county is guaranteed an amount
which is not less than 85 percent of
the amount received in the previous
year.

One-haIf of the funds appropriated
for the basic Chapter 1 program in
excess of the amount appropriated for
school year 1978-79 will be allocated
to the States and counties on the
basis 'of the number of children from
families below 50 percent of the
median national income for four-person
families, as determined by the 1975
Survey of Income and Education.
Within States, each local educational
agency will receive an amount based on
its percentage of the State's basic
Chapter 1 allocation.

Definition of Eligibility: Local
educational agencies (LEAs) are
eligible to receive funds under this
program. Individuals must be
educationally disadvantaged to receive
services. The LEA determines this.

====Educationally-Deprived Children—State Administration (84.012)====

Office of Assistant Secretary for
Elementary and Secondary Education,
Department of Education.

Objectives: To provide financial assistance to State educational
agencies to meet the special needs of educationally-deprived children.

Types of Assistance: Formula Grants.

====Head Start {{*}}/====

Head Start provides comprehensive
developmental services designed to
improve the quality of life for
children and their families. Intended
primarily for preschoolers from low-income
families, the program seeks to
foster the development of children and
to enable them to deal more
effectively with both their present
environment and later responsibilities
in school and community life. Head
Start programs emphasize cognitive and
language development, socio-economic
development, physical and mental
health, and parent involvement, to
enable each child to develop and
function at his or her highest
potential. At least ten percent of
enrollment opportunities in each State
are made available to handicapped
children.

Head Start provides a variety of
learning experiences that lay the
framework for success in elementary
school. Head Start children receive
comprehensive health services,
including immunizations and physical
and dental exams and treatment, and
hot meals to help meet daily
nutritional needs. The program also
emphasizes significant involvement of
the children's parents in their early
childhood development. Technical
assistance and training activities are
provided to local program staff to
enhance the quality and effectiveness
of the services offered. Grants to
carry out Head Start are awarded to
public and private non-profit
agencies. Head Start's legislation
includes a formula that determines
basic State allocations. The two
factors in the formula are the
relative number of poor children and
the number of recipients of Aid to
Families with Dependent Children in
each State as compared to all States.

{{*}}/ Information on this program
obtained from Commissioner Carl
Anderson, U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services.
{{p|420}}

Template:Nhsc-v1-419

2006-06-12T02:29:58Z

Jennifer Wada:

=Federal Responses To The Unique Needs Of Native Hawaiians=

The preceding two chapters have
analyzed and reviewed two suggested
federal responses to the unique needs
of native Hawaiians. The chapter
entitled "Existing Law, Native
Hawaiians, and Compensation" concludes
that the response of compensation for
any possible loss of land or
sovereignty is not available under
present law. The "Review of Hawaiian
Homes Commission Programs" reviews the
Hawaiian Home Lands program, including
ways to ensure better administration
of the program. This chapter sets
forth other federal responses that are
available or being undertaken.

==A. IDENTIFICATION OF FEDERAL PROGRAMS FOR WHICH NATIVE HAWAIIANS MAY BE ELIGIBLE==

The Federal Government sponsors a
vast array of programs administered
through a large number of agencies.
Five federal programs specifically
assist native Hawaiians. 1/ These
are: Title VII of the Native
Americans Program Act; 2/ Title III of
the Comprehensive Employment and
Training Act; 3/ the American Indian
Religious Freedoms Act; 4/ the Mental
Health Systems Act; 5/ and the
Hawaiian Homes Commission Act of 1921. 6/

The section that follows lists a
representative sample of existing
federal programs that meet some of the
needs of native Hawaiians that have
been identified in this Report.
Information on the majority of the
federal programs listed on the
following pages (except where
otherwise noted) was obtained from the
1982 edition of the Catalog of Federal
Domestic Assistance. [The next
edition of the Catalog is scheduled to
be released on July 1, 1983.] The
Catalog is a Government-wide
compendium of federal programs,
projects, services, and activities
that provide assistance or
benefits to the American public. It
contains financial and non-financial
assistance programs administered by
departments and establishments of the
Federal Government, and is published
annually by the Federal Government.
As the basic reference source of
Federal programs, the primary purpose
of the Catalog is to assist users in
identifying the programs that meet
specific objectives of the potential
applicant, and to obtain general
information on federal assistance
programs.

The following list is not meant to
be exhaustive—the Catalog itself
contains hundreds of programs that may
be of use to individual native
Hawaiians. The list is meant to be
indicative, however, of the range of
Federal Government programs now
available that may meet some of the
needs of native Hawaiians. The
numbers following the program title
are the reference numbers used in the
Catalog.

===Education: Elementary and Secondary===

====Compensatory Education for the Disadvantaged; Chapter 1 Grants to Local Educational Agencies {{*}}/====

:Description of Grant Process:

Authorization for Basic Grants are
computed for States and counties by
multiplying the number of children
5-17 years of age from low-income
families by 40 percent of the State's
average per pupil expenditure (but not
less than 80 percent nor more than 120
percent of the national average).
These children include: (1) children
in families with incomes below the
poverty level (1980 census data but

{{*}}/ Information on this program
obtained from the Office of Management
and Budget, February 1983.
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:consisted of more than 10,000 acres and the Commission did not make a selection from the acreage available, the grants of public lands in the area were valid. The Act, however, provided that the Commission must make selections of land in only three areas and Kawaihae I was not one of these. Thus, public grants were made of lands in the Kawaihae I area for which DHHL may have a claim because they did not acquire the total acreage mentioned in the Act. The present Deputy Attorney General stated that the 1966 opinion would be reviewed.

There are two major reasons for
DHHL not establishing a current and
accurate inventory of Home lands for
which it is the trustee. First, DLNR
never established a current and
comprehensive inventory of the State,
public, and Home lands. Until 1966,
DLNR administered the Home lands that
we're not yet homesteaded. DHHL began
assuming full responsibility for all
Home lands in 1965 but did not receive
an accurate, current, and
comprehensive inventory of the lands
from DLNR. Second, due to limited
financial resources and other
priorities, DHHL has not expended the
resources necessary to establish a
complete, accurate, and comprehensive
land inventory.

According to the Akinaka Study,
there remain Home lands for which
boundaries and areas are based on very
early surveys and determinations and
until such lands are accurately
resurveyed, doubts will necessarily
linger as to the true boundaries and
acreages of the available lands. A
rough estimate by DHHL is that 40
percent of these lands have not been
accurately surveyed.

====Land Withdrawals====

There needs to be an aggressive and
accelerated approach to resolve the
issue of Home lands which have been
withdrawn for public use. According
to DHHL there are approximately 17,270
acres of Home lands that are being
used by Federal, State, and county
governments for public purposes.
Approximately 13,600 acres of these
lands have been withdrawn under
Governor's Executive Orders (GEO's)
issued by the Territorial and State
Governors.

The State of Hawaii Attorney
General has determined that the GEO
powers did not extend to Home lands;
therefore, the withdrawals were not in
accordance with the Act. This opinion
was confirmed in a court case
involving Home lands withdrawn for the
General Lyman Airport on the island of
Hawaii. According to DHHL records,
the Home lands under GEO's and their
use are as follows:

{|
|-
| Public Service
| Acres
|-
| Airports
| 176
|-
| Schools
| 17
|-
| Parks
| 10
|-
| Forest/Conservation
| 767
|-
| Game Reserve
| 11,123
|-
| Public Service
| 128
|-
| Right of Way
| 4
|-
| Military
| 1,356
|-
|
| 13,601
|}

Although the Attorney General in
1975 issued the opinion that GEO
powers were not applicable to Home
lands, DHHL, because of limited
resources, has not made the effort
necessary to identify all lands that
have been withdrawn for public use,
determine the issues related to the
withdrawals, and develop recommendations
for the Commission to consider
in determining the course of action to
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:totaling 456 acres as Home lands that were not included in the blue book.

:6. There are Home lands which have been withdrawn from use by DHHL under various Governor's Executive Orders. As discussed in detail elsewhere in this report, the Attorney General and the courts have ruled that the Governor's Executive Order powers do not apply to Home lands; therefore, the withdrawals were not legal. The Akinaka Study and the DHHL blue book have excluded some of the acreage covered by Executive Orders. For example, 1,356 acres set aside by Executive Orders 382 on January 21, 1930 and 599 on December 22, 1933, are not included in either the Akinaka Study or the DHHL blue book. These lands in Lualualei, on the island of Oahu, are used by the United States Navy as part of radio transmitting station and an ammunition depot.

:7. The Akinaka Study included 40 acres in Kealakehe and 48 acres in Milolii which represented acreage to be obtained in an exchange that was never consummated.

:8. The tax maps show three parcels of land totaling approximately 148 acres of State of Hawaii lands. According to a Deputy Attorney General it appears that the parcels should be Home lands. The parcels were returned to the control of the Commissioner of Public Lands of the Territory of Hawaii to be used for the Molokai Airport under Hawaiian Homes Commission Resolution 61, October 12, 383 1938, and Resolution 77, May 13, 1942. The parcels were not included in the DHHL blue book inventory of public lands.

:9. One parcel of Home lands is now under private ownership and no lands were received by the Commission in exchange. The land consisting of 8 acres was withdrawn under Governor's Executive Order 545 for a tree nursery and forest ranger station. Then in 1947, the Territory Board of Public Lands included the land in a larger parcel of land exchanged for private-owned land to be included in the Kohala Forest Reserve. The DHHL land records do not include the exchanged lands in the Home lands inventory.

:10. The Act's use of the term "more or less" has created problems. For Home lands in an area where the acreage received by DHHL was less than the acreage provided by the Act no adjustment was made. To illustrate, in the area of Kalaupapa on the island of Molokai, DHHL received only 1,247 of the 5,000 acres "more or less" mentioned in the Act because the area contained only this amount of acreage. On the other hand, when the available acreage was more than the acreage mentioned in the Act, such as was the case in the Kawaihae I area on the island of Hawaii, DHHL did not receive the benefit of all of the acreage in excess of the Act amount. For the Kawaihae I area, DHHL was informed by the Attorney General in a July 19, 1966 memorandum that because the area of Kawaihae I
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sugar-cane lands, and (c) all public
lands held under a certificate of
occupation, homestead lease, right of
purchase lease, or special homestead
agreement..." DHHL and DLNR officials
informed us that they are not aware of
any maps showing lands available and
designated as Home lands at the time
the Act was passed or at the time the
State of Hawaii assumed responsibility
for the lands upon Statehood.
According to DHHL this lack of
accurate descriptions of available
land is demonstrated in Table 69.

The exclusions of the Act are also
factors that make it difficult to
define the Home lands acreage because
of the imprecise information
concerning the lands under the
exclusions at the time of the Act.
According to DHHL, there were
approximately 9,704 acres in forest
reserve at the time of the Act.
According to the cognizant Deputy
Attorney General there may be
approximately 14,197 acres of
additional forest reserve land that
were designated as such after the Act.
And, approximately 44 of the 14,197
acres were not included in the Akinaka
Study or the DHHL land inventory
records, and another 466 acres were
included in the Akinaka Study but not
the DHHL land inventory.

The exclusion of public lands under
sugar cane cultivation, according to
DHHL, accounts for a "loss" of
approximately 4,000 acres in the areas
of Waimanalo and Lualalei on the
island of Oahu, and Anahola-Kamalomalo
on the island of Kauai. The
identification of lands under sugar
cane cultivation at the time of the
Act was not documented. The process
of identifying these lands involves a
detailed review of sugar cane leases
that were in effect when the Act was
passed. DHHL has identified 809 acres
that may have been improperly excluded
from Home lands in the Anahola-
Kamalomalo area, partly because
of their questionable identification
as sugar cane lands.

Other examples of discrepancies or
problems relating to the land
inventory are as follows:

:1. The blue book maintained by DHHL included many adjustments of acreages made by DHHL personnel and the adjustments did not contain explanations of adjustments or make reference to supporting documents.

:2. The Akinaka Study did not include an area known as South Point in Kamaoa-Puueo on the island of Hawaii. According to DHHL the excluded area consists of 699 acres.

:3. The Humuula area on the island of Hawaii, according to the Akinaka Study, consists of 52,764 acres of Home lands while the DHHL blue book shows 52,781 acres. Further, a question has been raised as to whether this Home lands area should only be 49,100 acres. According to a Deputy Attorney General, State of Hawaii, the Commission only selected 49,100 acres in the required time period, 1921 through 1929.

:4. Lands used for roads in some cases have been included in the DHHL blue book and in other cases the road acreages were excluded. We were unable to satisfy ourselves as to the rationale of the exclusions or inclusions and were unable to determine the amount of excluded road acreage.

:5. Our limited comparison of tax maps with the DHHL blue book identified two parcels of land

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(1976)). Yet neither the landmark
decision in Thurston v. Bishop, 7 Haw.
421 (1888) (interpreting the 1840
Constitution) nor the other decisions
discussed previously (interpreting the
Great Mahele) hold that the native
Hawaiians held a "beneficial" title to
the Government and Crown lands. This
is especially significant in light of
the fact that the Hawaiian law of
trusts expressly recognized the
concept of "beneficial" title to land
(Kanoelehua v. Cartwright, 7 Haw. 327,
329-330 (1888); £f_. Montgomery v.
Montgomery, 2 Haw. 563, 569 (1862)).
Presumably, if the Hawaiian Supreme
Court had believed that the native
Hawaiians had a beneficial title, it
would have so held.

Finally, native Hawaiians do not
point to any suits prior to annexation
alleging a violation of some fiduciary
duty of the Government with respect to
the Government and/or Crown lands.
Yet there is no doubt that up to 1892
such a suit could have been filed in
the Hawaiian Supreme Court (which had
original equity jurisdiction until
1892) and, thereafter, in the First
Circuit Court (In re Bishop's Estate,
11 Haw. 33 (1897)).

121/ OHA's Comments, p. 26. As
noted, this argument assumes that the
native Hawaiians and the Hawaiian
Government are one and the same
entity.

122/ MacKenzie, pp. 83-85.

123/ Sac and Fox Tribe of Indians of Oklahoma v. United States, 161 Ct.
CI. 189, 192, 197 (1963), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 921 (1963).

124/ Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United
States, 348 U.S. 272, 278-279 (1955).
This analogy is apt since the Hawaiian
Government and native Hawaiians are
alleged to be one and the same entity.
This has nothing to do with the
doctrine of "permissive use."

125/ 348 U.S. at 278-279. In such a situation there is an absence of a
"definite intention by congressional
action or authority to accord legal
rights."

126/ Sac and Fox Tribe of Indians of Oklahoma v. United States, 161
Ct.Cl. 189, 192-193 (1963), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 921 (1963); and
Northwestern Band of Shoshone Indians
v. United States, 95 Ct.Cl. 642,
657-661, 681-684 (1942).

127/ Coos Bay, Lower Umqua, and Siuslaw Indian Tribes v. United States, 87 Ct. CI. 143, 153 (1938),
cert. denied, 306 U.S. 653 (1939).

128/ This paragraph treats the
native Hawaiians as an entity separate
from the Hawaiian Government. See
United States v. Mowat, 582 F 2d 1194,
1206 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied 439
U.S. 967 (1978) which implies that
the native Hawaiians had no recognized
title to the Crown and Government
lands.

129/ After annexation there existed
only one entity whose title to the
Government and Crown lands could, in
theory, have been recognized—namely,
the native Hawaiians as a group.

130/ See Joint Resolution No. 55 of
July 7, 1898, 30 Stat. 750, which
provides, in pertinent part:

: The existing laws of the United States relative to public lands shall not apply to such lands [the ceded lands] in the Hawaiian Islands; but the Congress shall enact special laws for their management and disposition: Provided, That all revenue from or proceeds of the same...[with certain exceptions] shall be used solely for the benefit of the inhabitants of the Hawaiian Islands for educational and other public purposes.

Treaties of cession do not generally
establish recognized title to ceded

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89/ Ibid. The contention that the
Hawaiian Government was the "single
landowning entity," for aboriginal
title purposes has been addressed
previously (see pp. 336 to 337
above).

90/ OHA asserts "...the title held
by native Hawaiians may have been not
only aboriginal in nature, but also a
formal, vested title" (OHA's
Comments, Alternate Chapter III, p.
12). The alleged "communal rights of
native Hawaiians" to the Crown and
Government lands (supposedly granted
by the 1840 Constitution and confirmed
by the Great Mahele) are equated with
land titles conferred by foreign
governments (e.g., such as titles
conferred by Spanish land grants).
(Senator Inouye's Comments, pp.
39-40.) Thus, Senator Inouye, too, is
effectively asserting that title to
the Government and Crown lands was in
the native Hawaiians.

91/ OHA's Comments, p. 26. Again,
OHA states that the native Hawaiians
and the Hawaiian Government are not
separate entities. The following
discussion in the text also responds
to the views of Keith S. Abe.

92/ Thurston v. Bishop. 7 Haw.
421, 437-438 (1888); Harris v. Carter,
6 Haw. 195, 201 (1877); and Kenoa v.
Meek, 6 Haw. 63, 65 (1872). See also
Hanifin, pp. 16-18.

It should be noted that ownership
of the Crown lands was in the king.
In the Matter of the Estate of His
Majesty Kamehameha IV, 2 Haw. 715
(1864). The Court of Claims held that
the Crown lands belonged to the office
of the sovereign rather than the
sovereign as an individual and became
Government lands when the monarchy
ceased to exist in 1893. Liliuokalani
v. United States, 45 Ct.Cl. 418,
426-428 (1910).

93/ Act of July 11, 1851 [1851]
Hawaii Laws 52 (2 Revised Laws (1925)
at 2196)).

94/ There were also other statutes
providing for sale of Government land t
the people; e.g., 1874 Session Laws, CY
24; 1876 Session Laws, Ch. 44 and 1878
Session Laws Ch. 5; and 1884 Session
Laws, Ch. 45; cited by Hanifin, p. 16,

95/ Thurston v. Bishop, 7 Haw. 421,
437-438 (1888).

96/ Indian law recognizes that
individual members of a tribe have the
right to use tribal property. United
States v. Cook, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 591,
593 (1873); and Whitefoot v. United
States, 155 Ct.Cl. 127, 133-135 (1961),
cert, denied, 369 U.S. 818 (1962). Cf.
United States v. Jim, 409 U.S. 80, 82
(1972), rehearing denied, 409 U.S. 1118
(1973).

97/ Hobbs, p. 41, note 17.

98/ OHA asserts that the title to
the Crown and Government lands "held
by native Hawaiians may have been not
only aboriginal in nature, but also a
formal, vested title" (OHA's
Comments, Alternate Chapter III, p.
12). In addition, OHA contends that:
(1) the native Hawaiians and the
Hawaiian Government were one and the
same entity insofar as holding title
to the subject lands is concerned; and
(2) the Great Mahele operated so as to
vest a "formal title" to said lands in
the Hawaiian Government (OHA's
Comments, pp. 23, 25-26). Also,
Senator Inouye alleges, in effect,
that the 1840 Constitution granted the
native Hawaiians' title to the Crown
and Government lands (Senator Inouye's
comments, pp. 39-41).

99/ Daws, p. 125, and Hobbs, p.
29. The Hawaiian Supreme Court held
in 1977 that the 1840 Constitution
"acknowledged that the people of
Hawaii are the original owners of all
Hawaiian land," State v. Zimring, 58
Haw. 106, 111 (1977). The Zimring
opinion ignores the fact that the 1840
Constitution was repealed by the 1852
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responsibilities relating to that
group (see OHA's Comments, pp. 29-30),
liability turns on whether a "special
relationship was created" (Cf. 180
Ct.Cl. at 502). Yet the wrongs
complained of (i.e., United States'
participation in the fall of the
monarchy and the annexation of Hawaii)
(see OHA's Comments, p. 30) cannot
give rise to a "special relationship"
under Clause (5). See Gila River
Pima-Maricopa Indian Community, et al.
v. United States, 190 Ct.Cl. 790, 800
(1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 819
(1970).

Finally, the central government
under the Articles of Confederation
possessed considerable jurisdiction
over Indian affairs within the States.
See United States v. Oneida Nation of
New York, 217 Ct.Cl. 45, 62-65 (1978).
By contrast, the Federal Government
had no jurisdiction over native
Hawaiian affairs prior to 1898.

73/ Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United
States, 348 U.S. 272, 279 (1955).

74/ Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United
States, supra, at 284-285. See also
Inupiat Community of the Arctic Slope
v. United States, Ct.Cl.
680 F.2d 122, 128-129 (1982), cert.
denied, 103 S.Ct. 299 (1982).

75/ See e.g., Fort Sill Apache
Tribe of the State of Oklahoma v.
United States, 22 Ind.Cl.Comm. 527,
543 (1970).

76/ One commenter suggests that
the statute of limitations is unfair
since some native Hawaiians were born
after 1951 and could not have filed
claims earlier. However, the Indian
Claims Commission Act is designed to
compensate the claims of appropriate
groups of individuals, not the claims
of individuals. If they were
qualified to file a claim under the
Act, native Hawaiians did not file
before August 13, 1951.

77/ MacKenzie, pp. 75-76, 83.

78/ Sac and Fox Tribe of Indians
of Oklahoma v. United States, 161
Ct.Cl. 189, 197 (1963), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 921 (1963).

79/ Ibid., emphasis added.

80/ Ibid., p. 192.

81/ Sovereignty over Indian tribes
comes from their presence within the
territorial boundaries of the United
States. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,
30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16-18 (1832).

82/ See MacKenzie, p. 76. She
argues that the 1848 Act affirmed the
aboriginal title in these lands "to the
Hawaiian people as a collective group"
and "recognized the traditional use
rights of native tenants." She further
contends that deeds executed by
Kamehameha III and approved by the
Hawaiian legislature evidenced
recognized title. Ibid., p. 83.

83/ Sac and Fox Tribe v. United
States, supra, 161 Ct.Cl. at 192.

84/ The theory that these acts do
accord recognized title is in
MacKenzie, pp. 83-85. For discussion
of these treaties see preceding chapter
above.

85/ Coos Bay, Lower Umqua and
Siuslaw Indian Tribes v. United States,
87 Ct.Cl. 143, 153 (1938), cert.
denied, 306 U.S. 653 (1939).

86/ Sac and Fox Tribe v. United
States, supra, 161 Ct.Cl. at 192-193;
and Northwestern Band of Shoshone
Indians v. United States, 95 Ct.Cl,
642, 657-661, 681-684 (1942).

87/ See also United States v.
Mowat, 582 F.2d 1194, 1206 (9th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 967
(1978), which implies that the native
Hawaiians had no recognized title to
the lands at issue.

88/ OHA's Comments, pp. 23, 25-26.
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The Commission held that by virtue
of the 1846 treaty "...the United
States had assumed the role of
protector of those Texas Indians who
participated in that treaty. In our
judgment the Federal Government did
not fulfill its role as protector of
the Indians" (36 Ind.Cl.Comm. at
18-79). Under the circumstances the
aboriginal rights of the plaintiff
tribes had been "effectively
extinguished by the United States" (36
Ind.Cl.Comm. at 19).

Even assuming, arguendo, that the
Provisional Government extinguished
the aboriginal title, if any, of the
native Hawaiians to the Crown and
Government lands, it does not follow
that the United States would incur any
liability for the acts of the
Provisional Government on the basis of
the Lipan Apache decision. This is
because there are crucial differences
between the situation in Lipan Apache
and the situation here. First, Texas
had been annexed by the United States
and was part of the United States
before the acts of third parties in
question took place. By contrast, in
1893, the Hawaiian Islands were not
part of the territory of the United
States. Second, after the annexation
of Texas, the United States was "in
charge of Indian Affairs" in Texas (36
Ind.Cl.Comm. at 18). By comparison,
as of 1893 the United States had no
control over the affairs of native
Hawaiians; sovereignty over native
peoples only arises when their lands
become included within the territorial
boundaries of the United States
(Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S.
(5 Pet.) 1, 16-18 (1835)). Most
importantly, in Lipan Apache the
United States had assumed a duty to
protect the Texas tribes that were
parties to the 1846 treaty, thereby
giving rise to a "special
relationship" within the meaning of
Section 2, Clause (5) of the Indian
Claims Commission Act (25 U.S.C.
§70a). Prior to 1893 (or 1898) the
United States had entered into no
treaty with either the Kingdom of
Hawaii or the native Hawaiians as a
group whereby it assumed the duty of
protecting the native Hawaiians
(including any duty to protect their
possession of lands that they
occupied). Cf. compare with United
States v. Oneida Nation of New York,
217 Ct.Cl. 45, 55-59 (1978) which held
there was a "special relationship"
with the Oneida Nation because in a
1784 treaty the Federal Government had
promised to protect the Oneidas in the
possession of the lands the Oneidas
occupied as of 1784.

72/ Senator Inouye states: "...it
could be argued that the United States
exercised some measure of control over
the Hawaiian Islands long before
annexation" (Senator Inouye's
Comments, p. 37, note 17).

It has been suggested that the
United States might be held liable
under Section 2, Clause (5) for the
Indians' loss of title to lands (which
had never been part of the public
domain of the United States) where
there is "true concert, partnership or
control of the Federal Government"
with regard to the specific acts of
third parties which effected an
extinguishment of title. Six Nations,
etc. v. United States, 173 Ct.Cl. 899,
904, 907-909 (1965). However, there
are no decisions holding the United
States liable under Clause (5) for the
acts of third parties on the grounds
of "true concert, partnership or
control of the Federal Government."
Moreover, in Lipan Apache Tribe, et
al. v. United States, 180 Ct.Cl. 487,
502 (1967) the Court noted the
language from the Six Nations opinion,
but stated with respect to Section 2,
Clause (5): "In any event, the United
States is held liable under this 'fair
and honorable dealings' clause not
because it has title to the property,
but because, by its own acts, it has
undertaken special duties which it has
failed to fulfil" (180 Ct.Cl. 502).
The comments have not established the
existence of any special duties owed
to the native Hawaiians. In addition,
where a native group claims that the
United States undertook certain trust
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(1959); Washoe Indian Tribe v. United
States, 21 Ind.Cl.Comm. 447, 448
(1969); Pueblo de Zia v. United
States, 19, Ind.Cl.Comm. 56, 64-65,
74-75, 77 (1968); and Pueblo of Taos
v. United States, 15 Ind.Cl.Comm. 666,
702 (1965).

66/ OHA's Comments, p. 23.

67/ Cf. Williams v. City of
Chicago, 242 U.S. 434, 437-438 (1917);
and Buttz v. Northern Pacific
Railroad, 119 U.S. 55, 69-70 (1886).

68/ Caddo Tribe of Oklahoma v.
United States, 35 Ind.Cl.Comm. 321,
339 (1975); Pueblo de Cochiti v.
United States, 7 Ind.Cl.Comm. 422,
450-454 (1959); and Pueblo de Isleta
v. United States, 7 Ind.Cl.Comm. 619,
645-646 (1959), aff'd, 152 Ct.Cl. 866
(1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 822
(1961).

69/ OHA's Comments, p. 25; Senator
Inouye's Comments, pp. 35-36.

70/ Temoak Band of Western
Shoshone Indians v. United States, 219
Ct.Cl. 346 (1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 973 (1979); United States v. Fort
Sill Apache Tribe, 209 Ct.Cl. 433
(1976); United States v. Northern
Paiute Nation, 203 Ct.Cl. 468 (1974);
and United States v. Northern Paiute
Nation, 183 Ct.Cl. 321 (1968).

71/ See e.g., United States v.
Northern Paiute Nation, 203 Ct.Cl.
468, 470 (1974). Furthermore, the
cases cited in the preceding footnote
involve situations where there was a
treaty that prospectively authorized
the acts of the third parties (219
Ct.Cl. at 356-357) or where there was
a "subsequent ratification and
adoption" by Congress of the acts in
question (203 Ct.Cl. at 474; and 183
Ct.Cl. at 340). The actions of United
States Minister Stevens that contributed
to the overthrow of the monarchy
were obviously not authorized by any
pre-1893 treaty between the United
States and Hawaii, nor were they
subsequently adopted by Congress.
Indeed, the actions of Stevens on
January 17, 1893, do not appear to
have been sanctioned by the Congress
or the President. The United States
Government is not liable for the acts
of an agent that exceed the scope of
the agent's authority. See Wisconsin
Central Railroad Company v. United
States, 164 U.S. 190, 210 (1896);
Hawkins v. United States, 96 U.S. 689,
691-692 (1877); Whiteside, et al. v.
United States, 93 U.S. 247, 256-257
(1876); and Filor v. United States, 76
U.S. (9 Wall.) 45, 48-49 (1869). The
paper by Melody MacKenzie and Jon Van
Dyke, "Regarding the Legal Aspects,"
contends that the Government is
responsible for the acts of an agent.
However, the United States is liable
only when it expressly waives
sovereign immunity, and it has done so
in specific circumstances and then
only for authorized acts.

Nor is the decision in Lipan Apache
Tribe, et al. v. United States, 36
Ind.Cl.Comm. 7 (1975) controlling.
In Lipan Apache, the United States was
held liable for the acts of the third
parties which effected an extinguishment
of aboriginal title of certain
Texas Indians to lands in Texas. The
acts in question occurred after Texas
was admitted to the Union as a State
in 1845. By the terms of admission
Texas retained ownership of public
lands within Texas; however, the
Federal Government held jurisdiction
over Indian affairs within Texas (36
Ind.Cl.Comm. at 18). On May 15, 1846,
the Federal Government entered into a
treaty with the plaintiff Indian
tribes whereby the tribes acknowledged
themselves to be 'under the protection
of the United States and no other
power, state or sovereignty whatever'
(36 Ind.Cl.Comm. at 51). The
Commission found that subsequently
(i.e., in the 1850's) the United
States, through its military forces,
had aided Texas authorities in placing
the tribes on reservations, thereby
extinguishing the plaintiff tribes'
aboriginal title to their Texas
lands.
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tenants to grow crops and pasture
animals on Crown and Government lands.
In addition, this statute was held to
have effected an implicit repeal of
all former gathering rights. This
statute evidences an absence of
collective rights in the Government
and Crown lands.

57/ OHA's Comments, p. 25.

58/ Ibid., p. 24.

59/ United States v. Santa Fe
Pacific Railroad Co., 314 U.S. 339,
347 (1941). OHA cites Mashpee Tribe
v. New Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d 575
(1st Cir. 1979) with respect to
abandonment of aboriginal title.
However, this case concerned
"abandonment" by the claimant of its
tribal status and not abandonment of
aboriginal title (592 F.2d at
586-587).

60/ Cf. Williams v. City of
Chicago, 242 U.S. 434, 437-438 (1917);
and Buttz v. Northern Pacific
Railroad, 119 U.S. 55, 69-70 (1886).

OHA also states: "Under
traditional principles of Indian law,
forcible dispossession by non-natives
[referring to the landing of American
troops on January 17, 1893], is not
voluntary abandonment and does not
extinguish aboriginal title" (OHA's
Comments, pp. 24-25). Temporary
forcible disposession of an Indian
tribe from its aboriginal title lands
by the sovereign had been found to
effect an extinguishment of title
(Northern Paiute Nation, et al. v.
United States, 7 Ind.Cl.Comm. 615,
616 (1959), aff'd, 183 Ct.Cl. 321
(1968)), but, as a general rule,
temporary forcible dispossession does
not operate to extinguish aboriginal
title where there is no evidence of a
Congressional intention to extinguish
title (United States v. Santa Fe
Pacific Railroad Co., 314 U.S. 339,
354-356 (1941)). Here, where the
Federal Government was not the
sovereign before 1898, the rule cited
by OHA has no applicability.

61/ Levy, p. 857.

62/ One theory advanced in the
comments received by the Commission is
that leasing of Government and Crown
lands is an example of "permissive
use" of aboriginal title lands that
did not effect an extinguishment of
aboriginal title (see Senator Inouye's
Comments, pp. 37-39).

The doctrine of "permissive use"
refers to use of an Indian tribe's (or
band's) aboriginal title lands by
another Indian tribe or band; this use
is specifically allowed by the tribe
or band holding aboriginal title
(Samish Tribe v. United States, 6
Ind.Cl.Comm. 159, 175 (1958);
S'Klallam Tribe v. United States, 5
Ind.Cl.Comm. 680, 704 (1957)). The
fact that non-native Hawaiians were
allowed to use the Government and
Crown lands is not evidence chat the
native Hawaiians held aboriginal
title to these lands. Cf. Confederated
Tribes of the Umatilla Indian
Reservation v. United States, 14
Ind.Cl.Comm. 14, 119 (1964).
"Permissive use" presumes the
existence of aboriginal title (14
Ind.Cl.Comm. at 119). Furthermore,
the use of Crown and Government lands
was authorized by the Hawaiian
Government—the sovereign—and not by
the native Hawaiians.

63/ United States v. Santa Fe
Pacific Railroad Co., 314 U.S. 339,
347 (1941); and Pillager Bands of
Chippewa Indians v. United States, 192
Ct.Cl. 698, 705 (1970).

64/ United States v. Santa Fe
Pacific Railroad Co., 314 U.S.,339,
347 (1941); Washoe Indian Tribe v.
United States, 21 Ind.Cl.Comm. 447,
448 (1969); and cf. United States v.
Northern Paiute Nation, 203 Ct.Cl.
468, 474-475 (1974).

65/ Cowlitz Tribe v. United
States, 25 Ind.Cl.Comm. 442, 451
(1971), aff'd, 199 Ct.Cl. 523 (1972);
Tlingit and Haida Indians v. United
States, 147 Ct.Cl. 315, 33.6-341
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30/ Betts, pp. 15-20; MacKenzie, p
76. One commenter takes the position
the Great Mahele did not extinguish
aboriginal title. However, the Great
Mahele was the process established
when individuals could acquire fee
simple ownership to Government and
Crown land and thus obtain vested
property interests. Such an action by
the Hawaiian Government was
inconsistent with the existence of
aboriginal title to the Government and
Crown lands, and together with other
actions inconsistent with aboriginal
title, operated to extinguish
aboriginal title, if any had existed,
prior to 1893.

31/ Nooksack Tribe v. United
States, supra, 3 Ind.Cl.Comm. at 495.

32/ 3 Ind.Cl.Comm. at 494-495.

33/ Skokomish Tribe v. United
States, 6 Ind.Cl.Comm. 135,
157-158 (1958). Cf. Red Lake, Pembina
and White Earth Bands, et. al. v.
United States, 164 Ct.Cl. 389, 393-394
(1964). The fact that land that is
the subject of a claim of aboriginal
title was explicitly included in a
treaty of cession involving said land
(and other land) does not establish
the existence of aboriginal title.

34/ See discussion in text above.

35/ Karen Blondin, A Case for
reparations for Native Hawaiians, 16
Hawaiian Bar Journal 13, p. 27; Levy,
pp. 857-859. In her article, A Case
for Reparations, Karen Blondin argues
that the Court of Claims decision in
Liliuokalani v. United States, 45 Ct.
CI. 418 (1910) makes clear that land
was collectively held and used by
native Hawaiians. In Liliuokalani,
the Court of Claims held that the
lands held as Crown lands by the Queen
should be treated as other Government
lands, so that the Queen's loss of the
lands did not give rise to a
compensable taking for her. Since the
Government lands, as discussed above,
are not regarded as owned collectively
by the native Hawaiians as a group,
the ruling in Liliuokalani does not
support Blondin's argument.

Further, in Sovereignty and Land,
MacKenzie argues that the 1840
Constitution created a trust
relationship among the king, chiefs,
and people by citing a statute that
reads:

:No man living on a farm whose name is recorded by his landlord, shall without cause desert the land of his landlord. Nor shall the landlord causelessly dispossess his tenant. (p. 6)

However, this statute was a mere
instrument of the chiefs to ke p the
laborers of their land from leaving
their homes for the developing cities
of Honolulu and Lahaina (Levy, p. 851).
It was not a statement of common use
and ownership. These laws and the
ones to follow were to represent a
move toward the philosophy of
individual ownership of land and a
break from whatever common use may
have existed in the traditional feudal
land system.

36/ See footnote 16, above.

37/ Nooksack Tribe v. United
States, supra, 3 Ind.Cl.Comm, at
494-495; Samish Tribe v. United
States, 6 Ind.Cl.Comm. 159, 172
(1958).

38/ OHA's Comments, p. 23.

39/ Act of August 6, 1850 §7
[1850] Hawaii Laws 203 (2 Revised Laws
(1925) at 2142); Hanifin, p. 18; and
Levy, p. 857.

40/ Levy, p. 857, note 57, citing
Oni v. Meek, 2 Haw. 87 (1858).

41/ OHA's Comments, p. 23.
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42/ 1880 Session Laws, p. 56;
cited by Hanifin, p. 18, note 16.

43/ Thurston v. Bishop, 7 Haw.
421, 438 (1888).

44/ Indian law recognizes that
individual members of a tribe have the
right to use tribal property. See
e.g., United States v. Cook, 86 U.S.
(19 Wall.) 591, 593 (1873); and
Whitefoot v. United States, 155 Ct.Cl.
127, 133-135 (1961), cert. denied, 369
U.S. 818 (1962). Cf. United States v.
Jim, 409 U.S. 80,82 (1972), rehearing
denied, 409 U.S. 1118 (1973).

45/ OHA's Comments, p. 28.

46/ Cherokee Nation v.
<u?Georgia
30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16-18 (1832); and
Johnson v. Mcintosh, 21 U.S. (8
Wheat.) 543, 572-574 (1823).

47/ Confederated Tribes of the
Warm Springs Reservation v. United
States, supra; Sac and Fox Tribe of
Indians of Oklahoma 161 Ct.Cl. 189,
201-202 (1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
921 (1963).

48/ It is argued that aboriginal
title existed as of 1893 and/or 1898;
see Betts, p. 14, MacKenzie, pp. 76
and 78.

49/ Confederated Tribes of the
Warm Springs Reservation v. United
States, supra, 177 Ct.Cl. at 194. To
prove the existence of aboriginal
title it must be shown that such title
was not lost or abandoned prior to the
alleged date of extinguishment.
Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla
Indian Reservation v. United States,
14 Ind.Cl.Comm. 14,116 (1964).

50/ Quapaw Tribe v. United States,
128 Ct.Cl. 45, 48-49 (1954).

51/ Quapaw Tribe v. United States,
1 Ind.Cl.Comm. 469, 488 (1951), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part on other
grounds, 128 Ct. CI. 45 (1954). OHA
states that "Native Hawaiians advance
no argument as to 'constructive
possession' of Government and Crown
lands" (OHA's Comments, p. 23).

52/ Puyallup Tribe v. United
States, 17 Ind.Cl.Comm. 1, 23-24
(1966). It appears that the
Government and Crown lands constituted
a defined area—one of the tests for
aboriginal title.

53/ 31 Cong. Rec, p. 6261
(1898).

54/ Cf. Caddo Tribe of Oklahoma v.
United States, 4 Ind.Cl.Comm. 218-219
(1956), appeal dismissed, 140 Ct.Cl.
63 (1957).

55/ See footnote 18, above; Jean
Hobbs, Hawaii: A Pageant of the Soil
(Stanford, Calif: Stanford University
Press, 1935), pp. 4-6 and 12-16.

56/ OHA comments that notwithstanding
the conversion of much land
to "individual fee-simple ownership,"
the Government and Crown lands were
"maintained as lands held by the
Hawaiian Kingdom for the chiefs and
people in common" (OHA's Comments, p.
24). In addition, OHA states: "One
indication of the collective rights in
these lands was the specific
recognition of native rights of
gathering and access on Government and
Crown lands" (OHA's Comments, p. 24)
The first assertion refers to OHA's
contention that the argument concerning
extinguishment of aboriginal title
is "irrelevant" because the Mahele
confirmed the title to the Crown and
Government lands in the Hawaiian
Government and thus, in effect,
confirmed the title in the native
Hawaiians. This assertion is
addressed in Part C of this chapter.
The second contention ignores that
portion of the Kuleana Act of 1850
that terminated the rights of native
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30/ Betts, pp. 15-20; MacKenzie, p
76. One commenter takes the position
the Great Mahele did not extinguish
aboriginal title. However, the Great
Mahele was the process established
when individuals could acquire fee
simple ownership to Government and
Crown land and thus obtain vested
property interests. Such an action by
the Hawaiian Government was
inconsistent with the existence of
aboriginal title to the Government and
Crown lands, and together with other
actions inconsistent with aboriginal
title, operated to extinguish
aboriginal title, if any had existed,
prior to 1893.

31/ Nooksack Tribe v. United
States, supra, 3 Ind.Cl.Comm. at 495.

32/ 3 Ind.Cl.Comm. at 494-495.

33/ Skokomish Tribe v. United
States, 6 Ind.Cl.Comm. 135,
157-158 (1958). Cf. Red Lake, Pembina
and White Earth Bands, et. al. v.
United States, 164 Ct.Cl. 389, 393-394
(1964). The fact that land that is
the subject of a claim of aboriginal
title was explicitly included in a
treaty of cession involving said land
(and other land) does not establish
the existence of aboriginal title.

34/ See discussion in text above.

35/ Karen Blondin, A Case for
reparations for Native Hawaiians, 16
Hawaiian Bar Journal 13, p. 27; Levy,
pp. 857-859. In her article, <uA Case
for Reparations, Karen Blondin argues
that the Court of Claims decision in
Liliuokalani v. United States, 45 Ct.
CI. 418 (1910) makes clear that land
was collectively held and used by
native Hawaiians. In Liliuokalani,
the Court of Claims held that the
lands held as Crown lands by the Queen
should be treated as other Government
lands, so that the Queen's loss of the
lands did not give rise to a
compensable taking for her. Since the
Government lands, as discussed above,
are not regarded as owned collectively
by the native Hawaiians as a group,
the ruling in Liliuokalani does not
support Blondin's argument.

Further, in Sovereignty and Land,
MacKenzie argues that the 1840
Constitution created a trust
relationship among the king, chiefs,
and people by citing a statute that
reads:

:No man living on a farm whose name is recorded by his landlord, shall without cause desert the land of his landlord. Nor shall the landlord causelessly dispossess his tenant. (p. 6)

However, this statute was a mere
instrument of the chiefs to ke p the
laborers of their land from leaving
their homes for the developing cities
of Honolulu and Lahaina (Levy, p. 851).
It was not a statement of common use
and ownership. These laws and the
ones to follow were to represent a
move toward the philosophy of
individual ownership of land and a
break from whatever common use may
have existed in the traditional feudal
land system.

36/ See footnote 16, above.

37/ Nooksack Tribe v. United
States, supra, 3 Ind.Cl.Comm, at
494-495; Samish Tribe v. United
States, 6 Ind.Cl.Comm. 159, 172
(1958).

38/ OHA's Comments, p. 23.

39/ Act of August 6, 1850 §7
[1850] Hawaii Laws 203 (2 Revised Laws
(1925) at 2142); Hanifin, p. 18; and
Levy, p. 857.

40/ Levy, p. 857, note 57, citing
Oni v. Meek, 2 Haw. 87 (1858).

41/ OHA's Comments, p. 23.
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13/ In a draft alternate to this
chapter, OHA comments that the native
Hawaiians are "not asserting
aboriginal title claims to Government
and Crown lands which passed into fee
simple ownership" (OHA's Comments,
Alternate Chapter III, p. 7.) About
720,000 acres of Government and Crown
lands passed into fee simple ownership
before 1898 (see discussion, above,
page 335 to 336, and Levy, Native
Hawaiian Land Rights, 63 Calif. L.
Rev. 848, 859 (1975)).

14/ The requirement of a single
landowning entity is discussed fully
in the cases cited below in footnote
15.

15/ Confederated Tribes of the
Warm Springs Reservation v. United
States, 177 Ct.Cl. 184, 206-207
(1966); Nooksack Tribe v. United
States, 3 Ind.Cl.Comm. 479, 494-495
(1955), aff'd, 162 Ct.Cl. 712 (1963),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 993 (1964); and
Muckleshoot Tribe v. United States, 3
Ind.Cl.Comm. 658, 674-675 (1955),
aff'd in part, vacated in part on
other grounds, 174 Ct.Cl. 1283 (1966),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 847 (1966).

16/ Levy, p. 859.

17/ Jon J. Chinen, The Great
Mahele; Hawaii's Land Division of 1848
(Honolulu: The University Press of
Hawaii, 1974), p. 5.

18/ Gavan Daws, Shoal of Time; A
History of the Hawaiian Islands, (New
York: The MacMillan Company, 1968),
pp. 124-5; see also above, chapter
entitled "Diplomatic and Congressional
History: From Monarchy to Statehood."

19/ Morris, The Land System of
Hawaii, 21 ABA Journal 649, 650
(1935).

20/ Levy, pp. 854-855.

21/ Some commenters objected to
the use of feudal terms in referring
to native Hawaiians* land ownership
patterns. The terms are used here to
assist those who are not native
Hawaiians in understanding land
ownership patterns.

22/ Levy, pp. 855-857. The paper
submitted to the Commission by the
Office of Hawaiian Affairs, "Regarding
the Legal Aspects," written by Melody
MacKenzie and Jon Van Dyke, contends
that although the Kuleana Act allowed
individual native Hawaiians to obtain
fee simple title to Crown or
Government lands that they actually
cultivated or Government lands they
purchased, it did not extinguish the
"people's" interest in the Crown and
Government lands. See the discussion
above, pages 335 to 336, and footnote
13, above. The MacKenzie/Van Dyke
paper is reproduced in its entirety in
the Appendix of this Report.

23/ Daws, p. 124.

24/ Levy, p. 857.

25/ Ibid., p. 859.

26/ Ibid.

27/ Ibid., p. 852, note 26.

28/ H. Rodger Betts, Report on the
Hawaiian Native Claims, Second Draft
(1978), p. 15. One comment received
by the Commission states that the 1840
Constitution affirms that the native
Hawaiians had aboriginal title to the
Government and Crown lands.

29/ Chinen, The Great Mahele, pp.
25-29. Betts concedes that the lands
at issue did not encompass 2,500,000
acres by 1898 (Betts, p. 15). Indeed,
Congress believed that the "public
lands" in Hawaii totaled only
1,740,000 acres. (H.R. Rep. No. 1355,
2nd Sess., p. 43 (1898)). MacKenzie
states that the lands at issue total
1.75 million acres.
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=EXISTING LAW, NATIVE HAWAIIANS, AND COMPENSATION=

==NOTES==

1/ Melody K. MacKenzie,
Sovereignty and Land: Honoring the
Hawaiian Native Claim (Honolulu:
Office of Hawaiian Affairs, 1982),
pp. 75-79.

2/ Patrick Hanifin's comments were
in the form of a detailed article that
is scheduled to be published in the
Hawaii Bar Journal in the Spring of
1983. The article is entitled
"Hawaiian Reparations: Nothing Lost,
Nothing Owed."

3/ This chapter looks at rights
under present law only; it does not
address whether Congress or the State
Legislature should consider enacting
new laws in these matters. Further,
in response to comments received by
the Commission, we reiterate that the
chapter looks only at whether native
Hawaiians have present legal rights to
compensation. It does not address
whether the United States' conduct in
Hawaii at the end of the nineteenth
century was proper, moral, or legal,
or what account of it the United
States should make. Those matters are
left for the Conclusions and
Recommendations section of the
Report.

4/ Some comments received by the
Commission on its Draft Report stated
that the tone of this chapter is
improperly adversarial. The chapter
attempts to address the full range of
views on the matters it covers; the
approach is intended to be
comprehensive rather than adversarial.
Other commenters stated that
comparisons of native Hawaiians to
North American Indians, Eskimos, and
Alaskan Natives were not appropriate.
However, we have examined the
experiences of and the laws applicable
to these groups whose experience as
native groups provides some
similarities to the experience of
native Hawaiians. Congressman Cecil
Heftel, in his comments and other
commenters recognize the use of such
analogies or rely upon such
analogies.

5/ Inupiat Community of the
Slope v. United States, __ Ct.Cl. __,
680 P.2d 122, 128 (1982), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 299 (1982).

6/ E.g., Northern Paiute Nation,
et. al. v. United States, 7
Ind.Cl.Comm. 322, 412 (1959), aff'd,
183 Ct.Cl. 321 (1968).

7/ Quapaw Tribe v. United States,
128 Ct.Cl. 45, 49 (1954).

8/ United States v. Seminole
Indians, 180 Ct.Cl. 375, 383 (1967).

9/ Ibid.

10/ Ibid.

11/ Caddo Tribe of Oklahoma v.
United States, 35 Ind.Cl.Comm. 321, 339
(1975). One commenter (on the Draft
Report) emphasized the view that the
native Hawaiians held aboriginal title
to Government and Crown lands as of
1898 and that this title was
extinguished by the United States when
annexation occurred (Melody K.
MacKenzie, Comments on the Native
Hawaiians Study Commission Draft
Report, (November 1982), p. 25;
hereinafter cited as "OHA's
Comments").

12/ Claims in the absence of such
a law are barred by the doctrine of
sovereign immunity.
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In contrast, in Hawaii the land
rights of the natives were determined
by a series of laws from 1850 to 1898,
subsequent to the Great Mahele of
1848, which established a mechanism
for the acquisition of fee title. The
Crown and Government lands established
by the Great Mahele eventually became
federal lands when Hawaii was annexed
by the United States. Title to the
lands was vested in the State of
Hawaii by the Hawaiian Statehood Act,
which does not contain a provision
protecting native land rights similar
to the one found in the Alaska
Statehood Act.
Therefore, the reasons that
impelled passage of the Alaska Native
Claims Settlement Act are not present
in the Hawaiian situation.

***

The purpose of this chapter has
been to examine the existing laws that
are most likely to provide a basis for
compensation to native Hawaiians for
any loss of lands or loss of
sovereignty. As set forth in detail
here, the review shows that existing
law provides no basis for such
compensation. Therefore, special
legislation would be required before
any such payments could be made.
Congress has responded in the past to
native American claims: once with the
passage of the Indian Claims
Commission Act in 1946, and again in
1971 with the Alaska Native Claims
Settlement Act.
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"Reform Cabinet" (appointed in 1887)
contained only one American
expatriate—the grandson of original
American Missionaries who had been in
Hawaii since 1828. (See discussion
above, p. 277 and Lorrin A. Thurston,
Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution
(Honolulu: Advertiser Publishing Co.,
Ltd., 1936), p. 277.)

Thurston added as well that "Among
the leaders of the conservatives were
the 'mission boys,' the sons and
grandsons of the early American
missionaries. Two of the strongest
conservatives were Sanford B. Dole and
P. C. Jones, members of the executive
committee" (Ibid., p. 277). Thurston
also stated: "Besides our own
military [Honolulu Rifles], we had the
support of the 'Drei Hundert,' chiefly
composed of Germans, who were reputed
to have served in the German Army"
(Ibid., p. 141). Thus, the military
wing of the League contained Germans
and was commanded by a Canadian.

71/ Kuykendall, Volume III,
p. 344.

72/ Ibid., p. 355.

73/ Memorandum written by Bayard
after conversation with Carter, July
6, 1887, Hawaiian Legation, Notes from
Vol. 3, MS Dept. of State; cited and
quoted in Charles C. Tansill, The
Foreign Policy of Thomas F. Bayard,
p. 391.

74/ Bayard MS, Foreign Relations,
1894, Appendix II, pp. 660-662,
793-817; cited and quoted in Tansill,
pp. 391-392. The above quote was
cited to indicate the possibility that
Minister Merrill was opposed to the
reformers, though it cannot be determined.
As pointed out in Tansill, p.
392: "There is nothing in the Bayard
manuscript that would confirm this
statement of Mr. Carter." From the
conversation that Bayard had on July
6, 1887, it would appear that
references to instructing Merrill not
to help Kalakaua are probably false.
What was interesting in the above
quote is that Merrill was not
considered an active ally of the
reformers nor American warships an aid
to their revolution.

75/ Kuykendall, Volume III,
p. 353. Inclusion of this discussion
of the Aki episode was suggested in
comments received by the Commission on
its Draft Report.

76/ Wodehouse to Foreign Office,
No. 15, very confidential, April 12,
1887, British Public Record Office,
Foreign Office 58/220; cited by
Kuykendall, Volume III, p. 353.

77/ Wodehouse to Foreign Office,
No. 10, confidential, March 16, 1887,
British Public Record Office, Foreign
Office 58/220; cited by Kuykendall,
Volume III, p. 353.

78/ Merrill to Bayard, unnumbered,
May 31, 1887, U.S. Department of State
Archives, Dispatches, Hawaii (also in
National Archives, Microcopy T-30,
Roll 24, 1st letter on roll).

79/ Merrill to Bayard, No. 124,
June 6, 1887, U.S. Department of State
Archives, Dispatches, Hawaii (also in
National Archives, Microcopy T-30,
Roll 23).

80/ Merrill to Bayard, Dispatch
No. 135, July 30, 1887, U.S.
Department of State Archives,
Dispatches, Hawaii (also in National
Archives, Microcopy T-30, Roll 23).

81/ Ibid.

82/ Kuykendall, Volume III, p.
358.

83/ Hawaii Daily Bulletin, June
28, 1887; cited by Kuykendall, Volume
III, p. 358.

84/ Daily Herald, July 1, 1887,
submitted as Enclosure 1 in Merrill to
Bayard, No. 125, July 1, 1887, U.S.
Department of State Archives,
Dispatches, Hawaii (also in National
Archives, Microcopy T-30, Roll 23).
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which the United States "condoned,
participated in or enjoyed the
benefits of the coercive activities of
the American expatriate group" which
is alleged to be chiefly responsible
for the 1887 Constitution (Comments by
Senator Daniel K. Inouye on the Draft
Report of Findings of the Native
Hawaiians Study Commission, pp. 14-15
(November 23, 1982)). This section is
added to explain that role.

58/ Ralph S. Kuykendall, Hawaiian
Kingdom, Volume III, The Kalakaua
Dynasty, 1874-1893 (Honolulu:
University of Hawaii Press, 1967), p.
350. Hereinafter referred to as
"Kuykendall, Volume III."

59/ Kuykendall, Volume III, pp.
351-352.

60/ Sanford B. Dole, Memoirs of
the Hawaiian Revolution, (Honolulu:
Advertiser Publishing Co., Ltd.,
1936), p. 48; cited by Kuykendall,
Volume III, p. 352.

61/ Kuykendall, Volume III, p.
352. The foregoing information is not
contained in James H. Blount's 1893
report. Neither Clarence Ashford "nor
Volney Ashford, in the statement which
he wrote for Commissioner Blount, say
anything about the Honolulu Rifles and
their part in the Revolution of 1887"
(Kuykendall, Volume III, p. 704, note
27). This is a critical omission in
light of the pivotal role of the
Honolulu Rifles with respect to the
adoption of the 1887 Constitution.
Specifically, the Honolulu Rifles
patrolled the streets of Honolulu and
arrested Walter Gibson, Kalakaua's
premier, just prior to the king's
assent to the formation of the cabinet
government. Kalakaua, who had called
out the Rifles himself on June 30,
1887, to keep order, had unwittingly
given official sanction to an army
that he discovered shortly afterwards
was unreliable. Fear of the worst
convinced the king to sign.

Obviously, concealment of the data
from Blount was beyond his control.
The salient point is that the absence
of this information from Blount's
report, for whatever reason, tends to
make it much less authoritative than
its proponents contend it is.

62/ Kuykendall, Volume III, p. 703,
footnote 9.

63/ Ibid., pp. 348-349.

64/ House Ex. Doc. No. 47, 53
Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 203; cited in
Kuykendall, Volume III, p. 348,
footnote.

65/ Ibid., p. 348, footnote.

66/ Quoted in A. D. Baldwin, A
Memoir of Henry Perrine Baldwin,
1842-1911 (Cleveland, 1915), pp.
55-56; cited in Kuykendall, Volume
III, pp. 348-349, footnote.

67/ Kuykendall, Volume III, p. 349,
footnote. Emphasis added.

68/ Blount Report, H. Ex. Doc. No.
47, 53d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 331
(1893).

69/ Kuykendall, Volume III, p.
348.

70/ Ibid., p. 347; and Enclosure
No. 5 to Dispatch No. 124 (Petition of
American Citizens to Merrill), U.S.
Department of State Archives, Dispatches,
Hawaii (also in National
Archives, Microcopy No. T-30, Roll
23). The names of only three members
of the Committee of Thirteen appear on
the petition of American citizens.
Presumably, if there had been more
than three American nationals on the
Committee, the names of more than
three members of the Committee would
have appeared on the petition. This
assumption is supported by the fact
that the Hawaiian League-sponsored
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Vol. I, No. 3, Ralph S. Kuykendall, p.
42 (1926). Note: Entire Dispatch No.
122 reprinted in Hawaiian Diplomatic
Correspondence.)

27/ Burns, p. 168.

28/ Bailey, p. 285.

29/ Joesting, p. 213.

30/ Damon, p. 160.

31/ Joesting, p. 214.

32/ Ibid.

33/ Mellen, p. 102.

34/ Ibid., p. 103.

35/ Bailey, p. 286.

36/ Mellen, p. 107.

37/ See comment received from
Robert C. Schmitt, p. 3.

38/ Mellen, p. 115.

39/ Ibid., p. 120.

40/ Ibid., p. 121.

41/ Bailey, p. <187.

42/ Mellen, p. 122.

43/ Damon, p. 166.

44/ Mellen, p. 125.

45/ Bailey, p. 288.

46/ Mellen, p. 164.

47/ Damon, p. 175.

48/ Mellen, p. 169.

49/ Damon, p. 192.

50/ Joesting, p. 217. Congressman
Daniel Akaka comments that the Draft
Report on page 184, "indicates that
the spark that ignited the
annexationists was the signing of a
bill to regulate the sale of opium and
a bill to establish a lottery"
(Akaka's Comments, pp. 5-6). In
addition, it is asserted that these
bills "...were merely used as excuses
by the annexationists to bring down
the Monarchy" (Akaka's Comments, p.6). Other commenters raised a similar
point.

The draft report does not refer to
the lottery bill until page 190, in
the section on Liliuokalani’s reign.
Moreover, the comments do not
accurately reflect the chronology of
events. The lottery bill was enacted
in 1893—not in 1886-1887 which is the
period discussed at pages 184-185 of
the draft report. More importantly,
the statement cited in support of
these comments is a December 20, 1893
statement made with respect to
conditions in 1893 and not events in
1886-1887. Finally, pages 184-185 of
the draft report refer to the
"reformers"—not "annexationists."

51/ Damon, p. 192.

52/ Joesting, p. 217.

53/ Bailey, p. 21.

54/ Ibid., p. 291.

55/ Joesting, p. 218.

56/ Bailey, p. 295.

57/ Senator Daniel Inouye and
others commented that the Draft Report
fails to inquire into the possible
role of the United States Government
in the adoption of the 1887
Constitution; i.e., the extent to
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18/ Burns, p. 158.

19/ Mellen, P. 75.

20/ Ibid.

21/ Bailey, P. 278.

22/ Burns, p. 165.

23/ Ibid., p. 168

24/ Ibid.

25/ Ibid., p. 170.

26/ With respect to the statement
that Celso Moreno and the king called
"for Hawaiians to throw out or kill
the planter sympathizers and foreign
interests groups on the Islands,"
Congressman Daniel Akaka commented:
"It is difficult to believe Kalakaua
capable of such intrigue and scheming"
(Akaka's Comments, p. 5).

Shortly after Celso Moreno was
installed as a member of the Hawaiian
Cabinet with the title of Minister of
Foreign Affairs in 1880, posters in
his support came out in all parts of
Honolulu. They were addressed to "All
true-born citizens of the country" and
asked them to support Moreno: "His
intention is to cast down the foreigners
and put in their places the
true Hawaiians..." (K. D. Mellen, An
Island Kingdom Passes,p. 91 (1958);
Copy of entire poster in Blount Rept.,
H. Ex. Doc. No. 47, 53rd Cong., 2d
Seas., p. 183 (1893).

Robert W. Wilcox, a Hawaiian who
supported Moreno and attended a mass
meeting of citizens to discuss the
Moreno appointment, proclaimed that
"foreigners were stirring up confusion
for their own evil purposes..." (E. M.
Damon, Sanford B. Dole, p. 156
(1957)). Sanford Dole, who attended
the mass meeting, reported his
feelings to his brother George. Dole
wrote: "Robert Wilcox...probably
egged on by the king...appears to wish
the destruction of white men..."
(Ibid., p. 157).

A first-hand account by James M.
Comly, the U.S. Minister Resident to
Hawaii (1877-1882), discusses the
Moreno incident of 1880 in some
detail, particularly in Dispatch No.
122, dated 21 August 1880 from
Honolulu. Comly reports that the
British, American, "Hawaiian citizens
who were natives of the United
States," and German residents of
Hawaii presented memorials "to interfere
for the protection of [their]
interests, and demand the dismissal of
the new Cabinet, as a menance to
[their] capital invested here."
Comly, who had informed the king of
strong opposition to Moreno, mentions
a discussion held by him and others in
which "the general impression seemed
to be that Moreno intended personal
violence if I did not give way."

With respect to the role of the
king it appears that at the very least
he was highly sympathetic to Moreno's
points of view. Kalakaua stated to
Minister Comly: "Mr. Moreno had shown
himself to be a very entertaining
companion, a man of large and novel
views in political and state affairs;
that he had been frequently surprised
to find out how exactly Mr. Moreno's
views coincided with his own; and that
he [had] put him in office because of
this harmony and sympathy..." (Comly
Dispatch, No. 122).

The dispatches of Minister Comly
pertaining to the Moreno affair and
its sequel include Nos. 104, 113, 121,
122, 131, 136, 141 and 149. "The
Moreno affair of 1880 is one of the
most curious and at the same time one
of the most important incidents in
Hawaiian history...These dispatches of
General Comly are an important
contribution to the history of the
reign of Kalakaua" (Hawaiian Diplomatic
Correspondence, Historical
Commission of the Territory of Hawaii,
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:It may not be amiss to present some of the criticisms against Kalakaua and his party formally filed with me by Professor W. D. Alexander...

:He gives an account of various obnoxious measures advocated by the king, which were defeated.

:In 1882 he says the race issue was raised by W. Gibson and only two white men were elected to the Legislature on the Islands.

Walter Gibson's influence over
Kalakaua was also illustrated in
passages of Gibson's diary as
follows:

:Sat., Jan. 15—"Examined the Explorer [a ship]. Propose to purchase her as a Government vessel to send to Samoa to carry Bush on his several missions."

:Sun., Jan. 16—"A talk with the King about the Explorer. He said that Aholo and Kanoa were opposed to the purchase of her. It is too much my enterprise. These natives are opposed. I am sorry to have our Polynesian movement checked." (Jacob Adler & Gwynn Barrett, The Diaries of Walter Murray Gibson, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1973), p. 114.

:Tues., Jan. 18—"Talked earnestly with the King about the purchase of the Explorer. He is convinced and with me. Told me to call a Cabinet early in the morning."

:Wed., Jan. 19—"A Cabinet Council at the Palace at 7:00 A.M. The King determined about purchase of Explorer—so decided in Council. I and Aholo, a Committee to make purchase. We went at 8 A.M. to Hotel and found Mr. Arundel. Concluded purchase for $20,000 in four installments, [sic] I have carried my point, and the Polynesian movement will not be checked." (Ibid., p. 115.)

:Fri., Jan. 21—"Completed the purchase of the Explorer—the vessel delivered to the Min. of Interior Aholo. I will now take charge of her as Secretary of the Navy—an empty title—but I will push this matter, our Polynesian confederation. Hawaii has the elements and prospects of a commanding Polynesian state— Kalakaua shall be a King." (Ibid., pp. 116-117.)

Lorrin Thurston and William Castle
were also very familiar with Gibson.
They were among the members of the
Committee of Thirteen who specifically
asked for his dismissal from the
Kalakaua Cabinet in 1887. Wm. R.
Castle, in his Reminiscences
(published privately in 1960 per the
University of Hawaii Library (Hawaiian
Collection)), wrote at p. 77:

:It was said at that time that Moreno was going to organize and consolidate a union of all the Pacific Islands under Kalakaua as emperor. The same way that dreamer Walter Gibson obtained a controlling influence over Kalakaua by holding out wonderful pictures of a vast future of boundless wealth for us if his, Gibson's plans were carried. No doubt these alluring pictures accounted in part for his determined plan to create an army and navy with which to conquer the Pacific. Through his dreams or to appreciate the fact that with every opportunity in his grasp to render his name immortal by a wise and beneficent leadership he was instead making a wreck of his reign...

As for the books by Wm. A. Russ,
the titles alone should explain
Gibson's absence from them. They were
entitled The Hawaiian Revolution,
1893-94 and The Hawaiian Republic,
1894-98. Gibson died in 1888.

The above comments also address
views expressed in comments received
by the Commission from Elmer Miller
about Kalakaua's policies.
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discuss Gibson, but he took testimony
of first-hand accounts from people who
were present in Hawaii at the time
Gibson was, and who knew him.

Blount's papers include an interview
he had with Hawaiian Chief
Justice A. F. Judd on May 16, 1893
(Interview No. 28, p. 371 of Blount's
report in House Ex. Doc. No. 47, 53d
Cong. 2d Sess. (Dec. 18, 1893)). The
questions were asked by Blount, himself,
concerning Gibson and his power.

:Q. Did Gibson use the race feeling to obtain power, and to maintain himself in it?

:A. He did; and he also used flattery to the King to exalt his position. He fostered in the King's mind the idea of proclaiming himself emperor of the Pacific in connection with the Samoan affair.

The interview Blount had with M. M.
Scott on April 10, 1893 went even
further. It implied that Gibson's
policies and influence not only caused
the 1887 revolution, but that the
impact of these policies were evident
even in 1893 (Interview No. 46, Ibid.,
p. 488 (1893)). Blount again
conducted the interview personally.

:Blount: What I want to know is this: Whether or not prior to 1887, and down to the revolution the controversies followed racial lines.

:Scott: This present revolution?

:Blount: Yes, were the contests generally parallel with racial lines?

:Scott: They were.

:Blount: Did these contests, parallel to what we have termed racial lines, grow out of the difference of opinion on questions of taxation or questions of taxation and legislation? How did they grow?

:Scott: No, they grew out of the office. Mr. Gibson advised it.

:Blount: Please bring that out.

:Scott: In the spring of 1882, when they held the election here, he advised it. He was the originator of the phrase "Hawaii for Hawaiians." He was a man of marked ability. He was the president of the board of education. He made speeches couched in careful language when the foreigners would see or hear them. He spoke Hawaiian well. His cry was "Hawaii for Hawaiians." He said to the people, the missionary has not been your friend. He leaves no outlet for you. He does not wish you to hold office. He [Gibson] puffed up Kalakaua with the idea that he could be emperor of all the Pacific Islands.

Regarding this and other comments,
Blount sent a dispatch (Blount to
Gresham, Correspondence No. 17, July
17, 1893, pp. 107-108, in H. Ex. Doc.
No. 47, 53d Cong., 2d Sess. (1893))
which stated:

:The great stir in Cabinet changes commenced with the Gibson Cabinet in 1882. He was a man of large information, free from all suspicions of bribery, politically ambitious, and led the natives and some whites...
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=DIPLOMATIC AND CONGRESSIONAL, HISTORY: FROM MONARCHY TO STATEHOOD=

==NOTES==

1/ Ethel M. Damon, Sanford Dole
and His Hawaii (Palo Alto, Calif.:
Published for Hawaiian Historical
Society by Pacific Books, 1957), p.
141.

2/ Kathleen Dickenson Mellen, An
Island Kingdom Passes (New York:
Hasting House Publishers, 1958), pp.
8-10.

3/ Ibid., p. 14.

4/ Paul Bailey, Kings and Queens
of Old Hawaii (Los Angeles, Calif.:
Westernlore Press, 1975), p. 267.

5/ Ibid.

6/ Mellen, p. 36.

7/ Damon, p. 141.

8/ Eugene Burns, The Last King of
Paradise (New York: Pellegrini &
Cudahy, 1952), p. 156.

9/ Ibid.

10/ Act of January 30, 1875, 19
Stat. 625-626.

11/ Charles C. Tansill, The
Foreign Policy of Thomas F. Bayard
(New York: Fordham University Press,
1940), p. 370.

12/ Ibid.

13/ Burns, p. 157.

14/ Edward Joesting, Hawaii: An
Uncommon History (New York: W. W.
Norton & Co., Inc, 1972), p. 211.

15/ Ibid., pp. 211-212.

16/ Bailey, p. 269.

17/ Congressman Daniel Akaka, in
his comments on the Commission's Draft
Report, questions the interpretation
in the Draft Report of events during
Kalakaua's reign because of the emphasis placed on the role of Walter
Gibson. He states: "If Gibson was in
fact so important a figure, why was
his participation in events ignored in
first-hand accounts of the period...?"
(Akaka'8 Comments, p. 5 ) . He adds:
"I seriously question this interpretation of history and the emphasis
placed on Gibson's influence with the
monarchy" (Akaka's comments, p. 5.)

Walter Gibson's influence on the
monarchy ended with his departure from
Hawaii on July 12, 1887. He died
shortly afterwards in the United
States on January 24, 1888. (K. D.
Mellen, An Island Kingdom Passes, pp.
200 and 212, (1958)). James H.
Blount arrived in Hawaii for the first
time on April 6, 1893 (Dispatch No. 1,
Spec. Comm.). His duties, upon
arrival in Hawaii, were to concentrate
on taking and compiling evidence and
testimony on the 1893 downfall of the
Hawaiian Monarchy and formation of the
Provisional Government, as well as the
state of affairs in Hawaii at the time
(E. M. Damon, Sanford Dole and His
Hawaii, p. 258 (1957); Gresham to
Blount, Correspondence No. 1, March
11, 1893 printed in H. Ex. Doc. No.
47, 53rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1893)). It
is self-explanatory that Blount
himself could not have been the author
of any first-hand account of the
Kalakaua/Gibson era. Indeed, the
scope of Blount's duties did not
include any need to investigate this
period.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, it
can be pointed out that the Blount
dispatches did discuss Gibson's
participation in the events of the
Kalakaua era. Not only did Blount
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prerogatives, or to extend the
legislative franchise." 286/ Members
of Congress did not want their voices
or votes to be undermined by the
addition of new senators and representatives.
Finally, these political
obstacles were overcome in the 85th
Congress and the State of Alaska was
admitted into the Union by the Act of
July 7, 1958 (72 Stat. 339).
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Country, was made popular by its fur
trade. This industry gained the
interest of the United States, Russia,
Spain, and England. Spain, however,
yielded her interest in that territory
to the United States in the Treaty of
1819, and later, in 1824, Russia
agreed to cease further settlements
south of 54° 40'. This left the
powers of the United States and Great
Britain as final competitors for the
vast territory. Prior to that time,
the United States and Great Britain
had entered into an agreement of joint
occupation in 1818 (8 Stat. 248),
which remained in effect for ten
years. On August 26, 1827, the 1818
agreement was essentially renewed, but
for an indefinite period of time with
a provision that either party could
terminate the agreement upon a twelvemonth
notice. 284/

Settlement in the Oregon Country
was slow until the early 1840's, when
large groups of emigrants began making
their way along the Oregon trail in
search of more prosperous lives. It
was this influx of American settlers
that provided the impetus for the
United States to define her claim
in the Oregon Country against Great
Britain. President Polk reoffered a
division of the territory at the 49th
parallel, but Great Britain refused.
The United States then exercised her
right to abrogate the Convention of
1827 while expressing her intention to
fight for the territory that she
claimed was rightfully hers by title.
New negotiations were begun and Great
Britain finally agreed to the division
of the Oregon Country at the 49th
parallel by the Treaty of June 15,
1846 (9 Stat. 869).

Oregon was provided with a
territorial government under the Act
of August 14, 1848 (9 Stat. 323).
This action had been delayed in the
Congress because of the heavily-debated
slavery issue. The people of
the Oregon territory then adopted a
constitution and state government.
Their application for admission into
the Union was accepted by the Act of
February 14, 1859 (11 Stat. 383). Th«
State of Oregon was formed and the
remainder of its territorial lands
outside the newly-declared boundaries
were made part of the Territory of
Washington.

====Alaska====

Alaska was purchased from the
Russians under the Treaty of March 30,
1867 (15 Stat. 539) for $7,200,000.
The treaty was not overwhelmingly
well received, but with the persistence
of Secretary of State Seward, it
passed the Senate.

The quest for Alaskan statehood was
a long and tedious battle. Alaska was
first established as a "civil and
judicial district" under the Act of
May 17, 1884 (23 Stat. 24), and was
not recognized under a territorial
government until the passage of the
Act of August 24, 1912 (37 Stat. 512).
The legislative record showed that the
first statehood bill was offered in
1916, followed in subsequent years by
extensive hearings and testimony on
the subject. At various times during
this period, bills for Alaskan
statehood had been acted upon
favorably in both houses of Congress
and in committees of each house. 285/
Ernest Gruening's book on The State of
Alaska, indicated that Alaskan industrial
interests and other partisan
interests were strongly against statehood,
and for maintaining the status
quo. They caused considerable delay
to Alaska's admission.

By the 1950's, even with party
platforms supporting statehood for the
last two incorporated territories,
Alaska and Hawaii, resistance continued
in the Congress. Senator Church
described the situation as "the
reluctance of Congress to share its
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:The acquisition must be read with all the facts; it expressed the national individualism; it was defensive, to preserve the national unity; a mere taking of adjoining land to protect the peace and prosperity at home; it was subjective, not objective. 279/

====Texas====

The circumstances surrounding the
annexation of Texas were quite
different from the circumstances
surrounding acquisition of Florida and
Louisiana. Texas was an independent
republic and had been since about
1835. At that time, Mexico had begun
losing control over the territory and
the Anglo-Saxon settlers organized a
provisional government of their own.
From that point on, there had been
constant struggles between the Texans
and Mexicans. President John Tyler,
in his message to the members of the
28th Congress during its second
session, stated that the continued
hostile relations between Texas and
Mexico would only prove detrimental to
the peace and prosperity of the United
States. 280/ To avoid this, President
Tyler offered a treaty of annexation
to Texas that Texas found most
agreeable. The Senate, however, did
not ratify the treaty. Tyler claimed
that the main objection to the treaty
was that it was not put to a popular
vote among the American people. Thus,
he felt it his "duty to submit the
whole subject to Congress as the best
expounders of popular sentiment." 281/

The flavor of the Congressional
debates in the 28th Congress, second
session, on the proposition for the
annexation or admission of Texas to
the Union indicated that the question
of slavery was the prime concern. To
divert attention from the preeminent
slavery issue, however, other
arguments against annexation came
into focus. These arguments included
the constitutional power of Congress
to acquire foreign lands, and the
effect of the Texas annexation on the
rights of Mexico and her possible
response to such action.

While slavery was at the heart of
the disagreement about the annexation
of Texas, the constitutional question
regarding the authority of Congress to
annex by joint resolution, rather than
treaty power, gained the most support
from those in opposition. Were it not
for an intendment to the joint resolution
providing that the President
could, if he deemed advisable, negotiate
with the republic instead of
proceeding with the resolution, the
action might never have passed the
Senate. 282/

Texas was ultimately annexed to the
Union by Joint Resolution No. 8, March
1, 1845 (5 Stat. 797). The resolution
of annexation anticipated immediate
statehood for the Republic of Texas.
Shortly thereafter, Joint Resolution
No. 1, December 29, 1845 (9 Stat. 108)
was passed, admitting the State of
Texas into the Union. Discussions
were brief in the 29th Congress on the
resolution to admit Texas; however, a
few remarks were made concerning the
propriety of the action of Congress
that effectuated the Texas annexation
The dissenting members of Congress
apparently became resigned to the
majority opinion. 283/

The annexation of Texas was a prime
example of the expression of the
popular political and social conditions
of the time. It was a rejection
of Mexico's continued hostilities in
the territory, an exercise of an
inherent power of Congress, and a
submission to the unyielding efforts
of the annexationists.

====Oregon====

The area of the Pacific Northwest,
which had been known as Oregon
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===Comparison to Admission of Other States===

====Louisiana====

The first parcel of land to be
added to the United States under the
powers of the new federal Constitution
was the territory known as the
"Louisiana Purchase." This land was
purchased by the United States from
France under the Treaty of April 30,
1803 (8 Stat. 200). The transaction
was necessary for the continued
success of the commercial traffic on
the Mississippi River and especially
for maintaining the important port at
New Orleans. Popular support for the
acquisition of the Louisiana territory
was strong because the acquisition was
viewed as a means of removing a large
European power from America's doorstep
and promoting national independence.
This sentiment overcame whatever
doubts were expressed by members of
Congress as to the constitutional
authority of the nation to acquire
foreign territory. 277/

A significant section of the Treaty
of Paris in 1803 was Article III,
which stated:

:The inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be incorporated in the Union of the United States, and admitted as soon as possible...

This provision anticipated the
admission of the Louisiana territory
in the near future. From the cession,
two territories were erected and a
temporary government provided for
under the Act of March 26, 1804 (2
Stat. 283). An enabling act was then
passed for the people of the Orleans
Territory on February 20, 1811 (2
Stat. 641) so that they might form a
constitution and state government and
request admission to the Union. This
goal was subsequently accomplished and
statehood was confirmed by the Act of
April 8, 1312 (2 Stat. 701).

====Florida====

The second area of land annexed to
the United States by means of treaty
was East and West Florida. This
territory was ceded by Spain to the
United States under the Treaty of
Amity, Settlement, and Limits,
February 22, 1819, and ratified by the
United States on February 19, 1821 (8
Stat. 252). The necessity of the
annexation of Florida was accepted
under the same principle as Louisiana,
that is, keeping the European powers
at a safe distance from home. 278/

The treaty with Spain contained a
provision under Article 6 similar to
that in the Treaty of 1803 with
France. It stated:

:The inhabitants of the territories which his Catholic Majesty cedes to the the United States, by this Treaty, shall be incorporated in the Union of the United States as soon as may be consistent with the principles of the Federal Constitution, and admitted to the enjoyment of all the privileges, rights, and immunities of the citizens of the United States.

In keeping with this agreement, a
temporary government was established
for Florida under the Act of March 3,
1819 (3 Stat. 523), superseded by the
Act of March 3, 1821 (3 Stat. 637)
following ratification of the treaty.
In January 1839, Florida formed its
constitution and state government and
asked for admission into the Union,
Florida statehood was confirmed by the
Act of March 3, 1845 (5 Stat. 742),
which also admitted the State of Iowa.

The acquisitions of Louisiana and
Florida were reflections of a growing
national policy described by John
Gorham Palfrey, who stated:
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World War II temporarily delayed any
further attempts for statehood.

The numerous proceedings on
Hawaiian statehood proved time and
time again that Hawaii had met all the
criteria for admission. Desire for
statehood was evidenced by the
approval of the state constitution in
the general election of November 1950,
by a 3-to-2 margin. 276/

After the war, procrastination on
Hawaiian statehood bills came mostly
from the United States Congress.
Alaska and Hawaii were in the midst of
the same political struggle and their
futures as territories or states were
at the sole discretion of the
Congress. Once the fight for Alaskan
statehood had been won, it was evident
that the last incorporated territory,
Hawaii, would soon achieve the same
status. Hawaii was finally admitted
to the Union as a State by the Act of
March 18, 1959 (73 Stat. 4).

===Hawaiian Boundaries===

The joint resolution of annexation
did not define the boundaries of
Hawaii, but merely accepted the
cession made by the government of the
Republic of Hawaii of "the Hawaiian
Islands and their dependencies." The
islands were listed as Hawaii, Maui,
Oahu, Kauai, Molokai, Lanai, Niihau,
Kahoolawe, Molokini, Lehua, Kaula,
Nihoa, Necker, Laysan, Gardiner,
Lisiansky, Ocean, French Frigates
Shoal, Palmyra, Brooks Shoal, Pearl
and Hermes Reef, Gambia Shoal, and
Dowsett and Maro Reef (Sen. Doc. No.
16, 55th Cong., 3rd Sess.).

The Admission Act of March 18, 1959
(73 Stat. 4) and the State Constitution
define the boundaries as "all
the islands, together with their
appurtenant reefs and territorial
waters, included within the territory
of Hawaii...except the atoll known as
Palmyra Island, together with its
appurtenant reefs and territorial
waters, but said state shall not be
deemed to include the Midway Islands,
Johnston Island, Sand Island (offshore
from Johnston Island), or
Kingman Reef, together with their
appurtenant reefs and territorial
waters."

Some question is presented regarding
the status of Midway Island. The
United States claims that it acquired
Midway on August 28, 1867. The Hawaiian
government, before annexation,
claimed it had acquired Midway on July
5, 1859, prior to the acquisition by
the United States. Thus, there is an
academic question of whether the
United States acquired Midway when it
annexed Hawaii or whether it acquired
Midway independently.

Palmyra Island was part of the
territory that the United States
acquired when it annexed Hawaii (see
United States v. Fullard-Leo, 331
U.S. 256 (1947)), but is not now part
of the State of Hawaii. Midway Island,
Johnston Island, and Sand Island were
included within the jurisdiction of
the United States District Court for
Hawaii by the Act of August 13, 1940
(54 Stat. 784) and it may be that the
specific exclusion of these islands
from the Admission Act and the
Constitution was merely to overcome
any presumption that might have arisen
from the 1940 Act that these islands
were in the Territory of Hawaii. In
any event, it is clear that Palmyra
Island was once part of the Kingdom of
Hawaii and the Territory of Hawaii but
is not now part of the State of
Hawaii. Midway Island is not part of
the State of Hawaii either; there is a
question of whether it was part of the
Hawaiian Kingdom. Midway, however, is
part of the Hawaiian Island chain.
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joint resolution for annexation was
substantially the same as the treaty
negotiated in the prior year with the
Republic of Hawaii, which was duly
ratified by its Senate. 273/

Soon after annexation, a
territorial government was established
for Hawaii under the Act of April 30,
1900 (31 Stat. 141). As early as 1903
the legislature of the Territory of
Hawaii began to petition Congress for
statehood. 274/ As in the case of
Alaska, the question of statehood for
Hawaii was the subject of numerous
Congressional hearings and debates for
many years. The proceedings in which
Hawaiian statehood was discussed
reflect that politics, both in the
United States and on the islands, was
a major factor in delaying Hawaii's
transformation from territory to
state.

The political situation in Hawaii
was best summarized by John A. Burns,
Delegate from Hawaii, in his article
entitled, "Statehood and Hawaii's
People." 275/ He described the
Hawaiian achievement of statehood as
the conquering of centralized
government and the emergence of
Hawaii's people. He admitted that the
overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy in
1893 was an unpopular event and that
the Hawaiian people distrusted the new
Provisional Government. Its rule was
much more stringent than that of the
monarchy since a large portion of the
general public was prevented from
voting, while power remained in the
hands of the propertied class. Burns
stated that the unpopularity of the
annexation was not because of
animosity toward the United States,
but rather a resentment for the
particular ruling party.

Directly after annexation, a
commission was set up to compose an
Organic Act for Hawaii. According to
Barns, two Hawaiian members of the
commission wished to add a property
and income requirement to the
educational qualifications for voting.
This provision would have prevented
the majority of the Hawaiian people
from voting. The efforts of Senator
Tillman of South Carolina blocked such
a measure, however, and the Organic
Act was passed in 1900 with only a
literacy requirement for voters.

The Territorial government
continued to be extremely restrictive.
Even though the Territorial
legislature had passed measures for
erecting county governments, the
Territorial executive repeatedly
vetoed them. Finally, the situation
evoked a Congressional investigation.
This resulted in an ultimatum by
Congress that called for the Territory
to organize county governments quickly
or Congress would do so. After this
directive, the Territorial executive
allowed a local government bill to
pass.

Delegate Burns listed a number of
other reasons why statehood was
delayed for Hawaii: besides county
government, the Hawaiian Homes
Commission, the bill of rights, and
other projects all involved excessive
amounts of time. In addition to
these reasons, the controlling
economic and political groups strongly
opposed statehood for their own
interests. After amendments were made
to the Agricultural Adjustment Act by
the Act of May 9, 1934 (48 Stat. 670),
placing strict limits on the amount of
sugar imported from Hawaii into the
continental United States, and
extensive investigations were made
into other Hawaiian affairs, the
controlling groups were compelled to
support statehood.

By 1935, Hawaiian statehood
hearings had become more active. It
was then suggested that a plebiscite
be held to determine whether Hawaiian
citizens approved of the statehood
proposal. A plebiscite held in 1940
showed a majority of the residents of
Hawaii favoring admission to the
Union. At that point, however,
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all, native Hawaiians opposed
annexation. 266/ Senator Caffery
informed the Senate on June 28, 1898,
that "the people of Hawaii do not want
annexation...When I speak of the
people of Hawaii I speak of the native
Hawaiians." 267/ He then submitted
documents concerning an 1893 interview
with a white Hawaiian born in the
islands in 1850. This gentleman
stated that if an annexation vote had
been taken "it would be overwhelmingly
defeated—almost to a man by the
native Hawaiians..." 268/

The Organic Act, passed by the
United States Congress, opened the way
for an open electorate in Hawaii.
With this development, Hawaiians sent
to the U.S. Congress their first
delegate, Robert Wilcox, a home rule
advocate and leader of native Hawaiian
insurrections in 1889 and 1895.
Hawaii's first Territorial Legislature
of 1901 was also composed largely of
native Hawaiians and Home Rule
advocates who proceeded to protest
annexation by delaying bills, failing
to pass the appropriation bill, and
calling for Governor Dole's removal
due to incompetence. 269/

==D. HAWAIIAN ADMISSION TO STATEHOOD COMPARED TO THAT OF OTHER STATES==

Hawaii was admitted to statehood in
1959 after more than sixty years as a
territory. This section of the report
includes a discussion of Hawaii's
admission, a statement of Hawaii's
boundaries at statehood, and a
comparison of the history of admission
with the admission history of
several other states. The selected
states, in the order of their
statehood, are: Louisiana, Florida,
Texas, Oregon and Alaska.

Under the Constitution, the
acquisition of new territory was
achieved by treaties with foreign
nations, except for Texas and Hawaii,
which were annexed by joint
resolution. The usual course after
annexation was the establishment of a
territorial government, the adoption
of a state constitution and
government, and the request for
admission. A few states did not
establish territorial governments:
Texas, Florida and California. 270/

Certain other requirements also
became standard for statehood:

:(1) The inhabitants of the proposed new State are imbued with and are sympathetic toward the principles of democracy as exemplified in the American form of government.

:(2) A majority of the electorate wishes statehood.

:(3) The proposed new State has sufficient population and resources to support State government and at the same time carry its share of the cost of the Federal Government. 271/

While the move to incorporate the
Hawaiian territory into the United
States was an important step toward
statehood, it was not an assurance for
its realization. The extended period
of time in which the islands remained
in territorial status was notable, but
it was not unique to Hawaii. Alaska
experienced the same delay in
achieving statehood. There were also
other states with long territorial
periods: Utah, 46 years; Arizona, 49
years; and New Mexico, 62 years. 272/

===History of Hawaiian Statehood===

Hawaii was annexed to the United
States by Joint Resolution No. 55,
July 7, 1898 (30 Stat. 750). The
legislative record indicated that the
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population is a matter of conjecture,
since none of Hawaii's constitutions
called for a popular vote on
annexation. Treaties were left to the
head of state with approval of the
legislature, 252/ as set forth in
Article 32 of the 1894 Hawaiian
Constitution. The proposed annexation
treaty of 1854 was initiated by the
king, a native Hawaiian. This
proposal failed when he died and the
new king rejected the treaty. 253/

One native Hawaiian was present and
voted for the Hawaiian Senate
resolution that ratified the
Annexation Treaty of 1897 between the
United States and Hawaii. 254/ This
final act in Hawaiian participation in
the treaty ratification process took
place in a Special Session of the
Senate of the Republic of Hawaii in
September, 1897. On the first day of
the session, September 8th, President
Dole listed the following reasons for
annexation: (1) a growing menace to
the population by immigration; (2) the
threat of great naval powers; (3) need
for United States' development of
resources; and (4) it was in the best
interests of all people of Hawaii.
255/ A protest resolution was also
submitted to the Hawaiian Senate,
signed by fifteen natives, stating
that a mass meeting had been held
confirming that "the native Hawaiians
and a large majority of the People of
the Hawaiian Islands" were against
annexation. 256/ On the second day of
the session a report was submitted by
the Committee on Foreign Relations
endorsing the ratification of the
proposed treaty of annexation and
agreeing with the reasons for annexation
presented by President Dole the
day before. This report was signed
by the committee, including J.
Kauhane, a native Hawaiian, on
September 9, 1897. 257/

The same committee also submitted a
report on the native Hawaiians' protest,
in which the committee concluded
that it was based more on sentiment
than real opposition and recommended
that the protest be laid on the table,
which it was. This report was also
signed by the committee, including J.
Kauhane, on September 9, 1897. 258/
The Hawaiian resolution for ratification
of the annexation treaty was
unanimously adopted by the Senate the
same day. 259/ One of those senators
voting to adopt the ratification
resolution was J. Kauhane, who was
also Vice-President of the Senate.
Senator Kauhane was the only native
Hawaiian who signed the annexation
ratification resolution, 260/ the only
instrument relating to annexation
other than the Treaty of 1897.

In the Congressional debate on
annexation, Representative Bland was
asked directly whether "the Senate of
Hawaii which ratified the treaty is
composed largely of native Hawaiians?"
The answer was: "Oh, Mr. Speaker, I
am not speaking of natives or
foreigners. There are a few white
natives." 261/

Providing further evidence of lack
of "native" participation in annexation
proceedings was the so-called
"monster petition" of 1897 262/ signed
by approximately 29,000 native
Hawaiians protesting annexation by the
United States. This petition was
investigated by the United States
Congress and the subsequent report
indicated that many names on it were
fraudulent. 263/ A large portion of
the 29,000 names on the list remained,
however, and they represented the vast
majority of the 31,000 "native
Hawaiians" living on the islands. 264/
This figure may be compared with the
3,196 actual voters in the first
election under the 1894 Constitution
held in 1896, and the 2,687 voters for
representatives in 1897. 265/

Congressional debate on annexation
is filled with comments to the effect
that it was known that most, if not
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The Texas and Hawaii annexations
were similar in several respects,
therefore. A number of expatriated
American citizens resided in both
Texas and Hawaii. In each, a failed
treaty attempt had preceded the
annexation by a joint resolution. As
stated in Senate Report No. 681 on the
Hawaiian annexation, "This joint
resolution [on Texas] clearly establishes
the precedent that Congress
has the power to annex a foreign
State...either by assenting to a
treaty of annexation or by agreeing
to articles of annexation or by act of
Congress based upon the consent of
such foreign Government obtained in
any authentic way." 241/ The argument
had the tone of certainty, but
those opposed argued against the
precedent. 242/

Opponents noted that the body of
the joint resolution annexing Texas
did not contain the words "annex" or
"annexing." Instead, the resolutions
read: "'may be erected into a State,1
...The proper title to the Texas
resolutions is shown by the Congressional
Globe to have been, 'Joint
resolutions declaring the terms on
which Congress will admit Texas into
the Union as a State.'" 243/ Representative
Mann replied in Congressional
debate that: "It is not
necessary to deny that the proposed
annexation of the Hawaiian Islands
constitutes a new departure in the
policy of our Government, for whether
it does or not makes no difference...
the Republican party...has never
shrunk from doing that which is right
and advantageous because it might be
called a new departure." 244/ To add
weight to the argument, it was
reported that one of the President's
advisors stated: "the President has
been very firm about it and means to
annex the Islands anyway..."
President McKinley himself told George
Cortelyou: "We need Hawaii just as
much and a good deal more than we did
California. It is manifest destiny."
245/

The annexation differed, as well.
In Texas, unlike in Hawaii, the people
voted on annexation. 246/

===Did Any Native Hawaiians Sign Annexation Documents?===

Determination of whether any native
Hawaiians signed the proposed 1897
annexation treaty first requires a
definition of "native Hawaiians."
Certain parties during the annexation
debate attempted to define second and
third generation whites born on the
islands as "white natives." For
example, it was argued that Lorrin A.
Thurston, a member of the Hawaiian
treaty delegation, whose parents were
born in Hawaii, and Chief Justice Judd
of Hawaii were "white natives of the
islands." 247/ Most agreed, however,
that "native Hawaiians" referred to
the original aboriginal natives of the
islands. This was clearly shown in
the census breakdowns concerning
Hawaii 248/ and in most of the
documents presented concerning
annexation.

However, the only way to determine
definitively how many native Hawaiians
were involved in annexation proceedings
is extensive genealogical
research. The Federal Archivist told
the Commission that this is both time-consuming
and expensive. The alternative
approach, checking surnames,
undoubtedly does not reliably identify
the number of native Hawaiians present
for legislative action.

The historical record, as detailed
below, indicates that no more than six
native Hawaiians 249/ were present in
the Hawaiian legislature when the 1894
Constitution of Hawaii was adopted.
This Constitution, valid until annexation,
called for Hawaii's annexation.
250/ Hawaii had a long history of
submitting requests for annexation to
the United States, both informally and
through negotiated treaties. 251/ How
many of these earlier requests were
actually supported by the native
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territory was added to Arizona by the
Gadsden treaty with Mexico of December
3, 1853-June 30, 1854; and Alaska was
annexed by treaty of purchase from
Russia on March 30, 1867.

In addition, in 1867 the United
States proposed to annex Denmark's
islands of St. Thomas, St. John, and
St. Croix by treaty. Those treaties
contained a clause for the assent of
the islands' people. The people
assented, but the treaty failed. 231/
St. Thomas, St. John, and St. Croix
were later annexed by treaty in 1917.
A proposed treaty for Santo Domingo
failed in 1870 when the clause for the
assent of the people resulted in a
rejection. The Congressional
consideration of the Santo Domingo
matter is helpful. After the failure
of the treaty to pass the Senate in
1870, numerous attempts were made to
pass a joint resolution to annex Santo
Domingo, but the Senate resolution
that finally passed called only for an
investigation of the annexation
subject. 232/ The House then
proceeded to kill any hopes of
annexation using the resolution
approach by passing an amendment that
stated nothing in the resolution shall
be "understood or construed as
committing Congress to the policy of
annexing..." 233/ When the investigation
report was submitted, promoting
annexation, it was debated for several
days and finally died because "it was
impossible to obtain the approval of
two-thirds of the senators for a
treaty, equally impossible to get a
majority vote in the House for a joint
resolution." 234/

In addition to these annexations of
territory by either treaty of purchase
or conquest, the United States also
acquired a large number of islands
under the Act of August 15, 1856. 235/
This act provided that private
American citizens could take possession
of (uninhabited) islands for the
United States under the principle of
discovery. The principal object of
such annexations was to secure the
guano located on those islands.
Approximately 70 islands became United
States territory during the period of
October 28, 1856, through June 21,
1894. 236/ In addition, the island of
Midway was annexed by the Executive
Office in 1868 under the principle of
discovery, "to create a naval station
there." 237/

Another means of acquiring
territory was the Proclamation used by
President Madison in 1810 to acquire
"possession" of territory purchased by
the United States in the Louisiana
Purchase. 238/ The territory had been
allowed to remain under Spanish
authority since the treaty with France
in 1803.

The annexation most analogous to
that of Hawaii, however, was the
annexation of Texas. Both were
"independent foreign states" that
became territories of the United
States under joint resolutions.
Texas assumed independence from
Mexico and negotiated a treaty with
the United States for annexation on
April 12, 1844. This treaty was
rejected by the United States Senate.
In indignation, a powerful movement
started in Texas favoring a treaty of
alliance with Great Britain or
possible reconciliation with Mexico.
239/ This movement aroused the people
of the United States and, in
consequence, a joint resolution passed
both houses of Congress providing for
the admittance of the territory of
Texas into the Union as a state. The
resolution left to the discretion of
the President whether to accept Texas
by treaty "or by articles of agreement
with the Government of Texas under
legislative authority, or by the act
of a convention chosen by the people
of Texas, under like authority." 240/
Texas preferred the convention method,
and the matter was submitted to the
people of Texas who voted in favor of
annexation.
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:not be derived from that agreement so much as from the act of the United States in taking possession. 223/

Senator Bate remarked on June 30,
1898, "that it is an innovation upon
all precedents known in the history of
this country and its legislation that
we should have a resolution from the
House of Representatives before the
Senate involving the precise question
that is still pending in the nature of
a treaty." 224/ To this nay be added
the statement concerning McKinley's
sentiments that, "He had thought of
Hawaii for a year while the treaty
languished in the Senate, and finally
adopted the medium of a joint
resolution for speed's sake though he
still disliked its quality of
evasion." 225/

President McKinley had evidently
considered using a joint resolution to
annex Hawaii as early as March 15,
1897. In a conference with former
Secretary of State Foster and
President Pro Tern of the Senate,
William Pierce Frye, the President
decided that because his party lacked
a two-thirds majority in the Senate:
"a joint resolution was best, since it
required simple majorities in each
house." 226/ However, after sudden
negotiations for the Annexation Treaty
of June 16, 1897, the treaty was
introduced in the Senate instead. The
President at this time "had now
abandoned the joint resolution scheme
because it smacked of weakness, and he
wished to gauge opinion while the
Treaty was debated." 227/

The joint resolution that was
finally used to annex Hawaii was not
introduced until world events made
plain to the President and Congress
that annexation was essential. All
concerned viewed it as an expedient.
The possibility that passage by a
majority of the more representative
House, as well as by the Senate, may
have indicated greater public support
than treaty ratification apparently
was not discussed by those considering
these issues.

===A Comparison to Annexation of Other Territories===

Inhabited territories, other than
those lands ceded to the Federal
Government by individual states, and
except for Texas, were annexed by
treaty until 1898. 228/ President
Jefferson, in considering the
territorial annexation of Louisiana in
1803, deliberated carefully whether he
had the constitutional authority to
annex. The Constitution prohibited
the Federal Government from exercising
all powers not expressly delegated to
it, and was silent on the subject of
territorial expansion. Amendment of
the Constitution was possible, but
Jefferson thought the time required to
amend could have lost the purchase of
Louisiana. He therefore entered into
a treaty with France to purchase and
annex the Louisiana Territory on
April 30, 1803. At the same time he
proposed "to procure a subsequent
ratification of the act in a
constitutional amendment that should
make specific provisions for future
acquisitions." 229/ Since the strict
constructionists were in the minority,
however, without amendment "the
troublesome question was deemed to be
settled in favor of the constitutionality
of territorial acquisition
for all time." 230/

The precedent set in the case of
Louisiana was subsequently followed in
other cases of annexation by treaty:
Florida was acquired from Spain on
February 22, 1819; California
basically was acquired by conquest in
1846-47, followed by a treaty with
Mexico on February 2, 1848; New Mexico
and Arizona were included in the
California treaty; additional
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unusual expedient of a joint
resolution of Congress to accomplish a
thing which ought to have been
accomplished nearly ten years ago"
217/

The proceedings in the Senate also
confirmed the fear that the treaty
lacked votes. Senator Morrill, during
annexation debate, stated: "Here the
Senate was informed about it after the
Secretary had signed the treaty, but
even the Senate did not permit itself
to discuss it except in secret
session until its paucity of votes was
disclosed; and it came originally in
the form of a treaty..." 218/ The
argument for holding secret sessions
was weak and the weakness of the
argument is evident from reading the
proceedings of this session of May 31,
1898, in which senators in the session
questioned the secrecy of anything
discussed there.

The proceedings of the secret
session show that the proponents of
annexation desired a secret session
not because of concern for war
security, but because they feared
defeat of the proposed 1897 treaty of
annexation. They used the war with
Spain to provide "the heat that
generated annexation." 219/ As
Representative Alexander stated on
June 11: "The annexation of the
Hawaiian Islands, for the first time
in our history, is presented to us as
a war necessity." 220/ This idea was
echoed by other legislators such as
Representative Pearson who said: "I
shall give my vote for this resolution
for the same reasons that I supported
the war revenue bill. I believe that
this is a necessary step in the
successful prosecution of the war with
Spain." 221/

The final argument involved the
appropriateness and constitutionality
of the resolution, although Congressional
debate on Hawaiian annexation
did not concentrate on the constitutional
authority of the Congress
to annex territory, as it did with
Texas. After discussion of this
issue, the next section of this report
considers the constitutionality
question in the context of the lack of
a plebiscite in Hawaii on the issue of
annexation, as was the case in Texas.
(See below, pages 305 and 312.)

Congressmen stated that the
annexation of Texas by joint
resolution was a precedent to be
followed in the Hawaiian case. Mr.
William Alden Smith of the House of
Representatives commented on the
annexation issue:

:While there can be no question, Mr. Speaker, but that treaty making was especially lodged by the Constitution in the President and Senate, and that the composition of the Senate was so framed that each State should have an equal voice, nevertheless, the exigencies which at times confront the Republic warn us of the importance of the popular branch of Congress, coming direct from the people; and the Texas precedent has made the votes of a majority of both branches of Congress sufficient. 222/

Representative Parker also stated
that, in dealing with Hawaii, the
proper means of annexation would
necessarily come from Congress, rather
than the treaty-making power. He gave
the following explanation:

:It is well understood to be a proper exercise of the treatymaking power that a nation may contract to sell part of its lands which another wishes to buy, but it may well be doubted whether a government can by treaty contract itself out of existence...It may acquiesce, it may agree, but the authority over these islands will
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On the heels of the Japanese scare
came problems with Spain as the United
States became involved in the affairs
of Cuba and the Philippines. Pro-annexationists
also used this as an
argument: "The expansionists were
quick to point out that suffering Cuba
tied in with Hawaii; it was America's
destiny to redeem them both. As war
with Spain loomed, Hawaii took on new
strategic importance for the war in
the Pacific." 212/

A listing of specific reasons for
Hawaii's strategic importance were
incorporated into both Senate Report
No. 681, which accompanied an earlier
proposed Senate joint resolution, and
House Report No. 1355, accompanying
the final proposed House joint
resolution for Hawaiian annexation.
These specifics included the prevention
of an alien establishment in
the North Pacific, thereby protecting
the U.S. Pacific coast, and securing
the commerce of the islands* A more
important consideration was that the
"...United States must act NOW to
preserve the results of its past
policy, and to prevent the dominancy
in Hawaii of a foreign people...It is
no longer a question of whether Hawaii
shall be controlled by the native
Hawaiian or by some foreign people;
but the question is, What foreign
people shall control Hawaii?" 213/

When war with Spain did come,
claims for the strategic importance of
Hawaii expanded to include arguments
for a coaling station. It was argued
that anything less than annexation
would keep Hawaii neutral and allow
other belligerents comfort. Most
important of all was ensuring that
Dewey's ability to defeat the
Spaniards at Manila in the Philippines
would not be weakened by lack of
supplies. Representative Hitt was
also concerned about a counterattack:

:For a war of defense the Hawaiian Islands are to us inestimably important, most essential, and in this light they have been most often discussed. The discussion in past years has attracted little public attention, because our people, until they were lately awakened by the war and the movement to re-enforce Dewey, have not thought much about the exposed situation of our western coast in case of war with a really great power or the necessity of possessing these islands confronting our Pacific coast.

:We learn fast in war time... 214/

President McKinley, "under such
circumstances, feared interminable
delays, and replaced the treaty...with
a simple resolution which could be
adopted by a simple majority." 215/
The fact that the administration felt
there was a real possibility that the
Senate would fail to ratify a treaty
with the required two-thirds majority
was noted by several members of
Congress. Among them was Representative
Crumpacker of Indiana, an opponent
of annexation, who stated in the
debate of June 14, 1898: "...the
treaty required the assent of two-thirds
of the Senators, and it became
apparent that it could not command
that assent, so it has been abandoned
and this expedient invented..." 216/

In a remarkable display of candor
and confidence, Representative
Dolliver of Iowa, in favor of annexation,
confirmed the comment of the
Indiana Representative on both simple
majority and expediency, by stating on
the day the resolution passed the House
that: "Now for the second time a treaty
has been negotiated annexing these
islands, and the opposition of less
than a majority in the Senate has held
up the treaty and we are driven to the
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available to the United States in the
Pacific, with the exception of Samoa
which, geographically, was not as
important. Victory at Manila Bay
provided the impetus for victory for
the annexationists in Hawaii. On
May 4, 1898, three days after the
Battle of Manila, the Newlands Resolution
for Annexation was introduced
in the House of Representatives.
Although there was still a great deal
of opposition, the Resolution finally
passed on June 15, 1898. After more
lengthy debate in the Senate, annexation
was approved on July 6, 1898.
Formal transfer of sovereignty
occurred on August 12, 1898, when the
Hawaiian Islands became a United
States territory.

==C. FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ANNEXATION==

===Why a Joint Resolution, Not a Treaty?===

The reasons for the use of a joint
Congressional resolution (the Newlands
Resolution) rather than a treaty to
annex Hawaii to the United States can
be ascertained through the documented
history of the annexation proceedings
as well as by a review of world events
that affected United States policies
at the time. Several attempts to
annex Hawaii to the United States had
taken place prior to 1898, one as
early as 1854. 208/ The treaty process
was tried until the alternative joint
resolution process succeeded in 1898.
Although members of Congress and other
government officials, as well as
private citizens, advanced numerous
reasons to use a joint resolution, the
primary motivation was expediency. A
joint resolution required only a
simple majority of the Congress,
whereas a treaty would have required a
two-thirds majority of the Senate.
209/ The need for annexation, by
whatever parliamentary means, was
believed urgent to protect the
strategic and military interests of
the United States in the Pacific.

A short review of world events
prior to debate and passage of the
1898 resolution clearly shows the
sense of urgency its backers felt. A
treaty of annexation was negotiated
between the United States and Hawaii
on June 16, 1897, and ratified by the
Hawaiian Senate later that year. This
treaty was submitted to the United
States Senate on the same day it was
negotiated, but "embroiled in the
tariff and lacking a clear majority,
much less a two-thirds vote of the
membership, the Republican senatorial
leadership delayed action." 210/ In
the meantime, Japan protested against
annexation as harmful to its nationals
in Hawaii, who now made up the
majority of the cheap labor force on
the islands. President McKinley was
fearful that Japan would take possession
of Hawaii before the United
States could annex it. On the subject
of Japan, one author writes that in a
conversation with Senator Hoar,
McKinley stated that:

:"We cannot let the islands go to Japan... Japan has her eye on them. Her people are crowding in there. I am satisfied they do not go there voluntarily, as ordinary immigrants, but that Japan is pressing them in there, in order to get possession before anybody can interfere." McKinley from the first acted on the basis of his new policy with a consciousness of American defense, an appreciation of the desirability of Pacific possessions, and an awareness of the designs of other powers. That consciousness would settle into a hardened conviction that America must assume her destiny in the Philippines as well as Hawaii.

:The Japanese scare, however true or false, generated heat, but not enough to accomplish annexation. 211/
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her Government would never have yielded to the provisional government, even for a time and for the sole purpose of submitting her case to the enlightened justice of the United States. 204/

In December 1893, a resolution was
adopted by the Senate directing the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
to determine, "Whether any, and If so,
what irregularities have occurred in
the diplomatic and other Intercourse
between the United States and Hawaii
..." 205/ The resulting report, the
so-called "Morgan Report," reached a
conclusion almost exactly opposite the
Blount Report. Again there were
complaints that not all the people
involved had been interviewed and that
important pieces of evidence were
lacking. The truth lies somewhere
between the two reports.

===The Republic and Annexation Attempts===

Meanwhile, it was evident to the
Provisional Government that the
political climate was not right for
annexation. A more permanent form of
government was necessary. Therefore,
a constitution for the Republic of
Hawaii was adopted on July 4, 1894.

The next few years were relatively
calm and stable, yet the aim of the
Hawaiian government remained annexation
to the United States. Repeated
overtures were made, but realization
of their goals remained distant until
1897. A new administration in
Washington would perhaps be more
favorable to annexation. A commission
was once again sent to negotiate a
treaty. The terms of the treaty were
agreed upon and the document signed on
June 15, 1897. The treaty was unanimously
ratified by the Hawaiian Senate
on September 10, 1897. Although it
had been introduced in the United
States Senate in June 1897, no action
was taken until December of that year.
After much debate and many delays, the
chances of the treaty receiving a
two-thirds majority in the
Senate appeared slim. On March 16,
1898, a joint resolution was
substituted for the Senate bill. Thus
the subject came before the entire
Congress, where only a simple majority
would be required in each House to
pass the measure. 206/

The strategic value of the Hawaiian
Islands in terms of naval and
commercial interests had long been
recognized. They lay in the center of
the Pacific Basin, a logical point for
refueling and resupply. Alfred Thayer
Mahan had written in a March 1893
article for Forum that it "may be
inferred the importance of the
Hawaiian Islands [is] as a position
powerfully influencing the commercial
and military control of the Pacific,
and especially of the northern
Pacific, in which the United States,
geographically, has the strongest
right to assert herself." 207/ Mahan
was not alone in his view. Other
naval strategists such as Theodore
Roosevelt and Commodore George
Melville argued the importance of the
islands to the United States as well
as the importance of keeping any other
nation from gaining a foothold there.

With Japan's emergence as a naval
force to be reckoned with in the
Pacific, and the growing threat of war
with Spain, the strategic argument was
popular in the United States, although
commercial Interests were equally
important. With America's entry into
the war with Spain, and Rear Admiral
George Dewey's operations and
victories in the Philippines, the
strategists' arguments became even
more important. Although Pearl Harbor
had been ceded to the United States in
1887, nothing had been done to develop
the site as a naval base. The
strategists argued that mere possession
of that harbor did not ensure
security as foreign interests could be
encouraged in other points in the
islands. At the beginning of the
Spanish-American War, Honolulu represented
the only coaling station
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though at first not officially relieved,
by Blount. Blount's instructions
read, in part:

:To enable you to fulfill this charge, your authority in all matters touching the relations of this Government to the existing or other government of the islands, and the protection of our citizens therein, is paramount, and in you alone, acting in co-operation with the commander of the naval forces, is vested full discretion and power to determine when such forces should be landed or withdrawn. 201/

By this time, Captain Wiltse had
been relieved as senior officer on the
Pacific Station by Rear Admiral Joseph
Skerrett. Wiltse was detached and
ordered home on February 28, 1893.
Blount ordered the Marines to return
to the Boston (one company of sailors
had already been withdrawn, the other
remained on shore) and he ordered that
the American flag be hauled down. On
May 24 he officially replaced Stevens
as Minister.

Blount remained in Hawaii until
August 9 when he returned to Washington
without waiting for a replacement.
His lengthy report (nearly 700 pages)
laid the blame for the revolution
squarely on Stevens and recommended a
restoration of the former government.
Based on this recommendation, and at
the urgings of Secretary of State
Walter Gresham, the President ordered
the new Minister to offer to aid
Liliuokalani to regain her throne with
the expectation that she would grant
full amnesty to those who had opposed
her. Liliuokalani's refusal to meet
this requirement, coupled with the
Provisional Government's emphatic
refusal to consider such a move,
negated the attempt. 202/ Meanwhile,
it was noted that Blount interviewed
neither the members of the Committee
of Safety nor the officers of the
Boston. There were complaints from
those who were interviewed by him that
their testimony was slanted in the
final report. 203/

After receipt of this report, in a
message to Congress on December 18,
1893, President Cleveland said, in
part:

:...The lawful government of Hawaii was overthrown without the drawing of a sword or the firing of a shot by a process every step of which, it may safely be asserted, is directly traceable to and dependent for its success upon the agency of the United States acting through its diplomatic and naval representatives.

:But for the notorius predilections of the United States Minister for Annexation, the Committee of Safety, which should be called the Committee for Annexation, would never have existed.

:But for the landing of the United States forces upon false pretexts respecting the danger to life and property the committee would never have exposed themselves to the plans and penalties of treason by undertaking the subversion of the Queen's government.

:But for the presence of the United States forces in the immediate vicinity and in position to afford all needed protection and support the committee would not have proclaimed the provisional government from the steps of the Government building.

:And finally, but for the lawless occupation of Honolulu under the false pretexts by the United States forces, and but for Minister Stevens' recognition of the provisional government when the United States forces were its sole support and constituted its only military strength, the Queen and
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:the authority which I claim as the constitutional sovereign of the Hawaiian Islands. 198/

By thus phrasing her protest, yielding
to the United States rather than to
the Provisional Government, Liliuokalani
had left open a door by which
she might regain her kingdom. She
nearly succeeded.

During the next two weeks, the
Provisional Government worked to
solidify its position. A commission
was sent to Washington to request
annexation. At the same time, a
commission was sent by the queen to
request a delay in any action until
investigations could be made into the
events of her overthrow.

Although Honolulu was apparently
peaceful during the last days of
January, rumors of counter-revolt were
rife in the city. The Provisional
Government's small military force
would clearly not be effective against
any major uprising. Consequently, on
January 31, a formal request was made
to Stevens to extend protection to the
government pending negotiations in
Washington. Stevens promptly
complied. On February 1, 1893, the
following order was given to Captain
Wiltse of the Boston:

:The Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands having duly and officially expressed to the undersigned, the fear that said Government may be unable to protect life and property, and to prevent civil disorder in Honolulu, the Capital of said Hawaiian Islands, requests that the flag of the United States may be raised, for the protection of the Hawaiian Islands, and to that end confer on the United States, through the undersigned, freedom of occupation of the public building of the Hawaiian Government and the soil of the Hawaiian Islands, so far as say be necessary for the exercise of such protection, but not interfering with the administration of the public affairs, by said Provisional Government.

:I hereby ask you to comply with the spirit and terms of the request of the Hawaiian Provisional Government, and to that end to use all the force at your Command, in the exercise of your best judgment and discretion, you and myself awaiting instructions from the United States Government at Washington. 199/

Accordingly, that same day the
American flag was raised over the
Government Building and custody of the
building was given over to U.S.
Marines.

Stevens' actions were accepted up
to a point by the State Department:
"So far as your course accords to the
de facto sovereign government the
material co-operation of the United
States for the maintenance of good
order and protection of life and
property from apprehended disorder, it
is commended; but so far as it may
appear to overstep that limit by
setting the authority of the United
States above that of the Hawaiian
Government, in the capacity of
Protectors, or to impair the
independent sovereignty of that
government by substituting the flag
and power of the United States, it is
disavowed." 200/

===The Blount and Morgan Reports===

There were no changes in the state
of affairs until April 1 when Representative
James Blount arrived at the
islands on a fact-finding commission.
Blount was under instructions from
President Cleveland to investigate
fully all aspects of the events that
had taken place. As Stevens' role was
under investigation, he was superseded
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