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her Government would never have yielded to the provisional government, even for a time and for the sole purpose of submitting her case to the enlightened justice of the United States. 204/

In December 1893, a resolution was adopted by the Senate directing the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to determine, "Whether any, and If so, what irregularities have occurred in the diplomatic and other Intercourse between the United States and Hawaii ..." 205/ The resulting report, the so-called "Morgan Report," reached a conclusion almost exactly opposite the Blount Report. Again there were complaints that not all the people involved had been interviewed and that important pieces of evidence were lacking. The truth lies somewhere between the two reports.

The Republic and Annexation Attempts

Meanwhile, it was evident to the Provisional Government that the political climate was not right for annexation. A more permanent form of government was necessary. Therefore, a constitution for the Republic of Hawaii was adopted on July 4, 1894.

The next few years were relatively calm and stable, yet the aim of the Hawaiian government remained annexation to the United States. Repeated overtures were made, but realization of their goals remained distant until 1897. A new administration in Washington would perhaps be more favorable to annexation. A commission was once again sent to negotiate a treaty. The terms of the treaty were agreed upon and the document signed on June 15, 1897. The treaty was unanimously ratified by the Hawaiian Senate on September 10, 1897. Although it had been introduced in the United States Senate in June 1897, no action was taken until December of that year. After much debate and many delays, the chances of the treaty receiving a two-thirds majority in the Senate appeared slim. On March 16, 1898, a joint resolution was substituted for the Senate bill. Thus the subject came before the entire Congress, where only a simple majority would be required in each House to pass the measure. 206/

The strategic value of the Hawaiian Islands in terms of naval and commercial interests had long been recognized. They lay in the center of the Pacific Basin, a logical point for refueling and resupply. Alfred Thayer Mahan had written in a March 1893 article for Forum that it "may be inferred the importance of the Hawaiian Islands [is] as a position powerfully influencing the commercial and military control of the Pacific, and especially of the northern Pacific, in which the United States, geographically, has the strongest right to assert herself." 207/ Mahan was not alone in his view. Other naval strategists such as Theodore Roosevelt and Commodore George Melville argued the importance of the islands to the United States as well as the importance of keeping any other nation from gaining a foothold there.

With Japan's emergence as a naval force to be reckoned with in the Pacific, and the growing threat of war with Spain, the strategic argument was popular in the United States, although commercial Interests were equally important. With America's entry into the war with Spain, and Rear Admiral George Dewey's operations and victories in the Philippines, the strategists' arguments became even more important. Although Pearl Harbor had been ceded to the United States in 1887, nothing had been done to develop the site as a naval base. The strategists argued that mere possession of that harbor did not ensure security as foreign interests could be encouraged in other points in the islands. At the beginning of the Spanish-American War, Honolulu represented the only coaling station


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